THE STONE This is the second in a series of interviews about religion that I am conducting for The Stone. The interviewee for this installment is Louise Antony, a professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and the editor of the essay collection “Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life.” Gary Gutting: You’ve taken a strong stand as an atheist, so you obviously don’t think there are any good reasons to believe in God. But I imagine there are philosophers whose rational abilities you respect who are theists. How do you explain their disagreement with you?
Most moral enquiry – particularly metaethical enquiry – is conducted in an arse-backwards way. Most philosophers appear to look at morality from the inside-out. And I’d suggest this inside-out view of morality is hampering our ability to understand the nature of morality in all its glorious messy complexity. Ockham’s Beard
Taxonomy of the Logical Fallacies
Evolving Thoughts | Struggling with impermanence and vagueness in a complex world Welcome to my blog and website. This is where whatever passes through my forebrain in sufficient coherence gets put, as an aide memoir. It is unedited, unchecked and unneeded. I reserve the right to revise my posts to correct errors, but I’ll mark them as they happen, if I think of it. I am the Holy Profit of Chocolatism, which is not a religion (okay, it has a deity).
Rationally Speaking by Massimo PigliucciAs I mentioned before, this semester I’m teaching a graduate level seminar on David Hume, and having lots of fun with it. During a recent discussion of sections 4 and 5 of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (“Sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding” and “Sceptic al solutions of these doubts”) the concept of metaphysical necessity came up.As is well known, Hume wasn’t very keen on metaphysics in general. One of the most famous quotes by him (in section 12 of the very same Enquiry) says: “If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No.
Philosophical Disquisitions (Part One) This is the second in a two-part series looking at Robinson and Darley’s article “Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioural Science Investigation”. It is commonly thought that changes to the substantive criminal law (i.e. the rules about counts as a crime and how much punishment should be attached to the commission of crime) can have a deterrent effect. At least, many policy debates and legislative changes proceed on that assumption.
PhilPapers: Online Research in Philosophy
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Table of Contents abduction (Igor Douven) Abelard [Abailard], Peter (Peter King) Abhidharma (Noa Ronkin) abilities (John Maier) Abner of Burgos (Shalom Sadik) Abrabanel, Judah (Aaron Hughes) abstract objects (Gideon Rosen) accidental properties — see essential vs. accidental properties action (George Wilson and Samuel Shpall) action at a distance — see quantum mechanics: action at a distance in actualism (Christopher Menzel) adaptationism (Steven Hecht Orzack and Patrick Forber) Addams, Jane (Maurice Hamington) Adorno, Theodor W. (Lambert Zuidervaart) advance directives (Agnieszka Jaworska) Aegidius Romanus — see Giles of Rome Aenesidemus — see skepticism: ancient aesthetic, concept of the (James Shelley) aesthetics affirmative action (Robert Fullinwider) Africana Philosophy (Lucius T. Outlaw Jr.)