
économie - sociologie
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Jean-Pierre CHEVALLIER
Les 8 banques américaines présentant un risque systémique mondial (faisant partie de la liste de la BRI des SIFIs, Systemically Important Financial Institutions ) respectent dans l’ensemble les règles prudentielles d’endettement dites de Bâle III . En effet, le total de leurs dettes ne dépasse pas 10 fois le montant de leurs capitaux propres. C’est le multiple d’endettement tel qu’il a été défini par ce bon vieux Greenspan et par la BRI, le leverage en anglais, correspondant au ratio Tier 1 de 10 % , à l’exception de Goldman Sachs, de Morgan Stanley et de JPMorgan qui n’en sont pas loin, surtout par rapport à leurs concurrentes non américaines, Ce classement dans l’ordre croissant du leverage tient compte des résultats du 1° trimestre 2012 pour les banques américaines, Deutsche Bank, Santander et Crédit Suisse . Pour les autres banques (non reclassées ici), les résultats sont ceux des bilans arrêtés fin 2011.Le Blog d'Olivier Berruyer sur les crises actuelles
!Maurice Allais - Prix_Nobel d'Economie 1988
Professor Antal E. Fekete
The Gold Problem Reviseted* The article The Gold Problem of Ludwig von Mises, published 47 years ago in 1965, just six years before he died (the gold standard died with him in the same year) has some breath-taking thoughts, for example, “the gold standard alone can make the determination of money’s purchasing power independent of the ambitions and machinations of governments, of dictators, of political parties, and of pressure groups”, or: “the gold standard did not fail: governments deliberately sabotaged it, and still go on sabotaging it.” But for all our admiration we would be amiss if we did not point out certain errors in his article. These are all errors of omission, and correcting them would hopefully make the Mises article even more helpful to the discriminating reader. Mises fails to answer his own question why gold is the best choice to serve as money. Indeed, why not another commodity, or a basket of commodities?Le blog de jean Claude Werrebrouck
Necronomie
Calculated Risk
On a nationwide basis, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac own or guarantee 60 percent of the mortgages outstanding, but they account for only 29 percent of seriously delinquent loans, obviously a much lower proportion than their share of the market. Even though the Enterprises have a smaller share of seriously delinquent loans than other market participants, they account for just over half of all Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP modifications. Between HAMP modifications and their own proprietary loan modifications, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have completed more than 1.1 million loan modifications since the fourth quarter of 2008. It has been well-publicized that there is one form of loan modification that FHFA has not embraced, that being principal forgiveness . To be clear, the disagreement is not about helping borrowers.net & sans détour
All this week, we are looking at the Housing Recovery theme, challenging assumptions that make up the bullish argument. Monday, we began with Debunking the Housing Recovery Story , starting with Shadow inventory. On Tuesday, it was Reality Check on Home Affordability . Yesterday, we looked at the Problem With Home Prices . Today in part 4, we take a closer look at F oreclosures — how many more are likely to occur, and what that means for future of any Housing recovery. Before we get into the details of Foreclosures, a caveat : As housing analysts, strategists, economists, we need to separate the concept of foreclosure as it should be practiced from the recent robosigning scandals .
The Big Picture
Shadow Government Statistics : Home Page
Zero Hedge
Some interesting stuff in John Mauldin's latest piece . We'll include some pertinent quotes along with our thoughts. China is growing by about 8% a year, which is amazing on the surface of it, as their exports are down about 20% (more in some sectors). How can that be? I continually read about how China is going to lead the world out of its global funk. And 8% growth in GDP does seem pretty strong.zero hedge | on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
Submitted by Tyler Durden on 03/22/2012 - 18:39 Auto Sales CDS China Consumer Sentiment Crude David Rosenberg Global Economy Housing Starts Iran Israel Merrill Michigan NAHB NFIB Payroll Data Personal Income recovery Rosenberg University Of Michigan Back in early 2011, even as the global economy was at best flatlining, the one goalseeked explanation to justify a levitating stock market (which was rising solely due to the short-term effect of transitory QE2 liquidity), was soaring corporate profitability (which only lasted as long as companies could trim some residual SG&A fat; they have now cut into the bone in terms of layoffs). This time around, with corporate margins having peaked, there had to be some other validation to explain away the "narrative" of the latest bout of central bank infused stock market levitation: it just happened that this time it was once again that old faithful, and always wrong, justification - decoupling.Aux infos du nain
... et en profitent pour tuer les petites banques via le ZIRP et la politique de taux zéro en tuant le business de l'intermédiation bancaire de base... Deux ans après qu’ Obama ait promis d’éliminer le danger des institutions financières trop grosses pour faire faillite, les plus grandes banques américaines sont en fait plus grandes qu’elles ne l’étaient avant la crise financière . Cinq banques d’JPMorgan Chase (JPM), Bank of America (BAC), Citigroup (C), Wells Fargo (WFC), et Goldman Sachs (GS avaient de $ 8,5 trillions d’actifs à la fin de 2011, ce qui équivalait à 56 pour cent de l’économie américaine et ceci contre 43 pour cent cinq ans plus tôt... Et JP Morgan continue d'accumuler les pertes sur son portefeuille illiquide de dérivés de crédit...Minuit Moins Une - Le blog de la crise qui arrive
28/03/2012 - L'Espagne prendra-t-elle le chemin de la Grèce? Dans les milieux économiques, certains observateurs le redoudent déjà. L'Espagne, en effet, peine à se relever de la crise économique. Le pays renoue avec la récession.Ce texte est un « article presslib’ » (*) Mardi, durant l’audition au Sénat, j’ai mentionné comme exemple de la mauvaise qualité des modèles financiers en général, le modèle de Black-Scholes pour la valorisation des options, dont on sait qu’il est faux depuis le jour des années 1970 où il a été conçu, et dont on a transformé pour pouvoir l’utiliser quand même, une variable d’état , c’est-à-dire dont on ne peut que constater la valeur, la volatilité, en une variable de contrôle , à laquelle on attribue une valeur au pifomètre des salles de marché. Comment diable a-t-on pu en arriver à ce sommet de la stupidité humaine ?

