26 December 2011Last updated at 01:47 GMT The Berlin Wall did not mark the end of grave clashes as many thought it would If we can stop thinking about what the future might bring and embrace the present for what it is, we would be a lot better off, writes John Gray. It's been some time now since history didn't end. Twenty-odd years ago, when the Berlin Wall was coming down, there were many who believed that there would be no more serious conflicts. The American writer Francis Fukuyama, who promoted the idea of the end of history in the autumn of 1989, declared that the chief threat in future would be boredom. A Point of View: The endless obsession with what might be
John Quiggin and I have a piece on the eurozone mess in the new issue of Foreign Affairs. The piece is subscriber-only, but we’re allowed to post it (in Web format) for six months or so on a personal or institutional website. Accordingly, the piece can be found below the fold. The piece was finished some weeks ago, but I think it holds up quite well. Four things worth noting. Hard Keynesianism in the European Union
New York, NY - Since November 2011, the European Central Bank, under its new president, Mario Draghi, has reduced its policy rates and undertaken two injections of more than 1tr euros of liquidity into the eurozone banking system. This led to a temporary reduction in the financial strains confronting the debt-endangered countries on the eurozone’s periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland), sharply lowered the risk of a liquidity run in the eurozone banking system, and cut financing costs for Italy and Spain from their unsustainable levels of last autumn. At the same time, a technical default by Greece was avoided, and the country implemented a successful - if coercive - restructuring of its public debt. A new fiscal compact - and new governments in Greece, Italy, and Spain - spurred hope of credible commitment to austerity and structural reform. Europe's short vacation
Satyajit Das: Europe’s The Road to Nowhere, Part 1 – Fiscal Bondage Yves here. As much as the image of Frau Merkel decked out as a domme is more than my tender sensibilities can take, the metaphor seems to apt for writers like Das to pass it by. By Satyajit Das, derivatives expert and the author of Extreme Money: The Masters of the Universe and the Cult of Risk Traders, Guns & Money: Knowns and Unknowns in the Dazzling World of Derivatives – Revised Edition (2006 and 2010) Financially futile, economically erroneous, politically puzzling and socially irresponsible, the December 2011 European summit was a failure.
This “Modest Proposal” by authors Varoufakis and Holland outlines a three-pronged, comprehensive solution to the eurozone crisis that simultaneously addresses the three main dimensions of the current crisis in the eurozone (sovereign debt, banking, and underinvestment), restructures both a share of sovereign debt and that of banks, and does not involve a fiscal transfer of taxpayers’ money. Additionally, it requires no moves toward federation, no fiscal union, and no transfer union. It is in this sense, say the authors, that it deserves the epithet modest. To stabilize the debt crisis, Varoufakis and Holland recommend a tranche transfer of the sovereign debt of each EU member-state to the European Central Bank (ECB), to be held as ECB bonds. Publications | Levy Economics Institute of Bard College
How much does time cost? That depends what you need it for. The time that Europe's leaders want to buy to tackle the euro crisis is a precious commodity. And its price keeps going up and up. Initially, it was supposed to cost €110 billion ($130 billion). That's how expensive the first EU bailout package for Greece was. Delusions of the Euro Zone: The Lies that Europe's Politicians Tell Themselves - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International
Exit from comment view mode. Click to hide this space CAMBRIDGE – As if the economic ramifications of a full-blown Greek default were not terrifying enough, the political consequences could be far worse. A chaotic eurozone breakup would cause irreparable damage to the European integration project, the central pillar of Europe’s political stability since World War II. Europe’s Next Nightmare - Dani Rodrik - Project Syndicate
The future of the EU: Two-speed Europe, or two Europes?
Exit from comment view mode. Click to hide this space NEW YORK – The eurozone crisis is reaching its climax. Greece is insolvent. Portugal and Ireland have recently seen their bonds downgraded to junk status. Spain could still lose market access as political uncertainty adds to its fiscal and financial woes. The Eurozone’s Last Stand - Nouriel Roubini - Project Syndicate
Robert Barro: An Exit Strategy From the Euro Until recently, the euro seemed destined to encompass all of Europe. No longer. None of the remaining outsider European countries seems likely to embrace the common currency. Seven Eastern European countries that recently joined the European Union (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) have announced their intention to revisit their obligations to adopt the euro. Two non-euro members of the EU, the United Kingdom and Denmark, have explicit opt-out provisions from the common currency,...
The eurozone’s terrible mistake The FT is reporting today that the new fiscal rules for the EU “include a commitment not to force private sector bondholders to take losses on any future eurozone bail-outs”. If this principle really does get enshrined into some new treaty, it will be one of the most fiscally insane derelictions of statesmanship the world has seen — but it certainly helps explain the short-term rally that we saw today in Italian government debt. Right now, the commitment is still vague:
Act Two in the unfolding Eurozone drama begins this week as leaders at the European summit announce emergency measures to prevent further market turmoil. Why the sudden urgency? Because the German Bundesbank is about to exhaust its capacity to lend more funds to strapped governments. In the wake of the 2008 crisis, some national central banks, especially those in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (the GIIPS), have dramatically increased their loans to financial institutions. To fund these loans, GIIPS central banks borrowed mainly – via the ECB – from other central banks, in particular the Bundesbank. Eurozone Crisis, Act Two: Has the Bundesbank reached its limit?
by Justin Fox | 3:32 PM December 8, 2011 It’s always good to have a Plan B, and probably a Plan C and D as well. You can’t cover every possible contingency, but having a set of options lined up in case things don’t work out as expected is a basic rule of good risk management, entrepreneurship, negotiation, career planning, and all number of other endeavors. So why is it that the creators and subsequent managers of Europe’s grand experiment with a common currency never came up with a contingency plan in case things didn’t work out? It wasn’t that they didn’t know the risks: lots of economists were warning in the 1990s that a currency union with no mechanism for ironing out fiscal and trade imbalances between its members was doomed to fail. Playing the Ultimatum Game with Merkozy - Justin Fox
The second death of politics The recent rise of technocratic governments in Italy and Greece is the culmination of a process that has been unfolding in Europe over the last 20 years. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent triumph of neoliberal ideology, there has been a trend toward de-politicisation, a wholehearted embrace of the neoliberal order apparently devoid of a viable and promising alternative. Politics died its first death in celebrations of a growing consensus that communism was a thing of the past, sealed by Francis Fukuyama's diagnosis of the end of history. Apparently lacking a clear enemy, neoliberalism was ready solemnly to declare its worldwide hegemony. To be sure, we also observed flashes of political polarisation in the post-9/11 world.
Europe – Be Greedy When Others are Fearful? « kelpiecapital
Exit from comment view mode. Click to hide this space LONDON – The recent European Union summit was a disaster. Both Britain and Germany played the wrong game: British Prime Minister David Cameron isolated Britain from Europe, while German Chancellor Angela Merkel isolated the eurozone from reality. The Euro in a Shrinking Zone - Robert Skidelsky - Project Syndicate
Understanding developments in the European crisis has become rather like Kremlinology, trying to figure out the meaning of subtle changes in wording and rearrangements of the Politburo on the podium for May Day parades. One example is Mario Draghi of the European Central Bank (ECB). Sometimes the bank president suggests that he will do what nearly everyone else can see is necessary for the survival of the euro: print lots of them and use some to buy EU government debt, following the example of the Fed and the Bank of England. At other times, it’s as if Jean-Claude Trichet, a former bank governor who boasted of the ECB’s “impeccable” performance in sticking to its 2 percent inflation target, is doing a ventriloquist act, with Draghi in the unflattering role of dummy. In one respect, last week’s EU agreement was anything but subtle. EU leaders were prepared to go ahead without the United Kingdom, suggesting that they have something serious in mind. The Erosion of the EU
Fed Watch: Is Europe About to Unravel?
Fighting (for?) Europe: How European Elites Lost a Generation - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International
Time for Plan B: How the Euro Became Europe's Greatest Threat - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International
Euro Debt Crisis
Satyajit Das: “Progress” of the European Debt Crisis
Comment] It's time for countries to restructure their debts
Euro Statement Translated
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