Terrorisme, insurrection ou résistance : cartographier et nommer « l'internationale djihadiste » Depuis la fin des années 1990, on a vu naître et se développer des mouvements islamistes fondamentalistes transnationaux sans vraiment pouvoir en faire une cartographie plus précise que d’indiquer de vagues localisations géographiques où ces groupes opéraient, ou encore les lieux des attentats qui leur étaient attribués.
Ces mouvements qui semblaient disparates et agir indépendamment les uns des autres, à l’exception d’Al-Qaida, se sont structurés petit à petit, tout au long des années 2000, et surtout après le début des révoltes arabes en 2011. Ils se sont transformés en organisations politiques, idéologiques et militaires, qui commencent à tisser entre elles des liens étroits. Depuis 2013, elles ont même entrepris de se « territorialiser » - avec plus ou moins de succès (certaines tentatives de territorialisation sont « contrariées » par des interventions militaires occidentales). Cette toute première approche ignorait tout de ce qui se passait au sud du Sahara. Al-Qaida planning kamikaze attacks on ships in Mediterranean, cables claim. There Is No Global Jihadist ‘Movement’ Untitled. Over the past couple of weeks, the open jihad has taken ground in Libya, Nigeria, Syria, and Iraq.
It's ongoing success is due to innovations developed by a large and growing number of contributing groups. Groups like: ISIS affiliated forces in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Yemen toBoko Haram in Nigeria toISIS and AQ affiliated terrorist groups inside Saudi Arabia, UK, Egypt, etc. Open jihad evolves (gets better) through massively parallel co-development. All of the groups in the open jihad, no matter how small (even down to individuals), can contribute. Tinkering with tactics, strategies, and technologies that can be used to advance the open jihad.testing the efficacy of these innovations by using them against the enemy. The groups in the open jihad can communicate successful innovations without even using the forms of communication we pay the NSA tens of billions a year to spy on.
THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF A TERRORIST NETWORK. Distributed, dynamic terrorist networks cannot scale like hierarchical networks.
The same network design that makes them resiliant against attack puts absolute limits on their size. Visualizing Terror — Tim Stock. Diapositive11.jpg (JPEG Image, 720 × 540 pixels) The Future of Terrorism According to VICE. Belgian arms dealer confesses to supplying Paris attackers - World Israel News. Mark Babich sur Twitter : "Where do #foreignfighters in #Iraq & #Syria come from #ISIS #CharlieHebdo #JeSuisCharlie #Bosnia #Kosovo #Albania" "Je ne suis pas Charlie. Et croyez-moi, je suis aussi triste que vous.". "Je ne suis pas descendu parmi la foule.
" Un @sinaute exprime, dans le forum de discussion de la dernière chronique de Daniel Schneidermann, son malaise vis-à-vis de "l'union nationale" suite aux attaques meurtrières qui ont visé Charlie Hebdo. En cause, la "dérive islamophobe" du journal et de cette gauche "Onfray/Charlie/Fourest laïcarde". Visualizing Terror — Tim Stock. Westgate mall attacks: urban areas are the battleground of the 21st century. Things aren't where we left them when we headed off into the mountains after 9/11. When the hangover clears, and the generation that fought in Afghanistan and Iraq comes home from these wars, we'll find that much of what we thought we understood has changed. The future of al-Qaeda: Results of a foresight project by Open Briefing. Terror financiers are living freely in Qatar, US discloses. 4 Rules of War from Al-Qaeda.
A World of Terror. Alain CHOUET (Direction de la securite a la DGSE) au Sénat sur al qaida.
Son approche des confréries (ici les FM) donne une idée de la capacité d'analyse de l'ex-DGSE... ;-£ Il cite 1789 et l'adoubement divin dans ce discours pseudo-mondain. Des "services" laïques ? Hmm. – reel
Number of Islamic Extremists Groups Up 60 Percent Since 2010.
Tribal structure collapse. Terror: The Hidden Source by Malise Ruthven. Radical Islamic Terrorism in Context, pt I. How to make sense of radical Islamic terrorism?
This violence is barbaric - but it is not senseless. When you understand the society from which savagery has sprung, the cold logic behind these attacks becomes all too apparent. Part I in a series; Part II is here. Brendon O'Niell says it is time to recognize the sheer barbarity of 21st century Islamic terror attacks: "In Western news-making and opinion-forming circles, there’s a palpable reluctance to talk about the most noteworthy thing about modern Islamist violence: its barbarism, its graphic lack of moral restraint. I applaud Mr. "Time and again, one reads about Islamist attacks that seem to defy not only the most basic of humanity’s moral strictures but also political and even guerrilla logic.... consider the attack on Westgate in Kenya, where both the old and the young, black and white, male and female were targeted.
There are problems with this line of thought. Lets talk a bit about the social system Mr. Radical Islamic Terrorism in Context, pt II. How to make sense of radical Islamic terrorism?
This violence is barbaric - but it is not senseless. When you understand the society from which savagery has sprung, the cold logic behind these attacks becomes all too apparent. The Middle East's Tribal DNA. Conflicts within the Middle East cannot be separated from its peoples' culture.
Seventh-century Arab tribal culture influenced Islam and its adherents' attitudes toward non-Muslims. Today, the embodiment of Arab culture and tribalism within Islam impacts everything from family relations, to governance, to conflict. While many diplomats and analysts view the Arab-Israeli dispute and conflicts between Muslim and non-Muslim communities through the prism of political grievance, the roots of such conflicts lie as much in culture and Arab tribalism. The state of al-Qaeda: The unquenchable fire. Is Al-Qaeda's Central Leadership Still Relevant? Government officials, scholars, and analysts continue to debate the extent to which Al-Qaeda's central leadership remains relevant to today's battle against terrorism.
After U.S. forces eliminated the group's safe haven in Afghanistan in late 2001, many argued that Al-Qaeda had transformed into a decentralized organization with little vertical hierarchy, that it had become "more of an ideology than an organization. " In the words of one analyst, Al-Qaeda was seen as "a fragmented terrorist group living on the run in the caves of Afghanistan.
West embargoes arms to Syrian rebels over their resale to al Qaeda. An Arms Pipeline to the Syrian Rebels More than 160 military cargo flights for Syria’s rebels, mostly from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have landed in Turkey and Jordan since January 2012.
By Sergio Peçanha – The New York Times DEBKAfile Special Report, March 30, 2013, 2:45 PM (GMT+02:00) The Western arms pipeline to the Syrian rebels fighting Bashar Assad is starting to run dry since the discovery that some of the weapons are being resold and used by al Qaeda in its conquest of southern Syrian and takeover of positions on the Jordanian and Israel borders. An Arms Pipeline to the Syrian Rebels - Graphic.
Training camps. Monitors. Maps & Charts. To class. Analysis. Funding. Al Qaeda. Geographic repartition.