The Iraq War via the National Security Archive
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Document Friday: Joint Chiefs of Staff “History” Brief of the Iraq War Gets it Dead Wrong. « UNREDACTED
A recently declassified Joint Chiefs of Staff Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) History Brief gets it dead wrong. According to the JCS, the United States military did not begin planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq until 9 July 2002, less than two months before President George W. Bush “approv[ed] overthrow of Saddam Hussein” on 29 August 2002.
THE IRAQ WAR -- PART III: Shaping the Debate
Hood-Winked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War , by John Prados Washington, D.C., October 4, 2010 - For nearly a year before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the British government of Prime Minister Tony Blair collaborated closely with the George W. Bush administration to produce a far starker picture of the threat from Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) than was justified by intelligence at the time, according to British and American government documents posted today by the National Security Archive. With the aim of strengthening the political case for going to war, both governments regularly coordinated their assessments, the records show, occasionally downplaying and even eliminating points of disagreement over the available intelligence.
Washington, D.C., September 22, 2010 – Following instructions from President George W. Bush to develop an updated war plan for Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks in November 2001 to initiate planning for the “decapitation” of the Iraqi government and the empowerment of a “Provisional Government” to take its place.
THE IRAQ WAR -- PART I: The U.S. Prepares for Conflict, 2001
Hood-Winked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War , by John Prados Washington, D.C., October 1, 2010 – Contrary to statements by President George W. Bush or Prime Minister Tony Blair, declassified records from both governments posted on the Web today reflect an early and focused push to prepare war plans and enlist allies regardless of conflicting intelligence about Iraq’s threat and the evident difficulties in garnering global support. Perhaps most revealing about today’s posting on the National Security Archive’s Web site is what is missing—any indication whatsoever from the declassified record to date that top Bush administration officials seriously considered an alternative to war. In contrast there is an extensive record of efforts to energize military planning, revise existing contingency plans, and create a new, streamlined war plan.
THE IRAQ WAR -- PART II: Was There Even a Decision?