Continental philosophy It is difficult to identify non-trivial claims that would be common to all the preceding philosophical movements. The term "continental philosophy", like "analytic philosophy", lacks clear definition and may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views. Simon Glendinning has suggested that the term was originally more pejorative than descriptive, functioning as a label for types of western philosophy rejected or disliked by analytic philosophers.[4] Babette Babich emphasizes the political basis of the distinction, still an issue when it comes to appointments and book contracts.[5] Nonetheless, Michael E. Rosen has ventured to identify common themes that typically characterize continental philosophy.[6] First, continental philosophers generally reject scientism, the view that the natural sciences are the only or most accurate way of understanding phenomena. The term[edit] History[edit] Recent Anglo-American developments[edit] See also[edit] Notes[edit]
20th-century philosophy Current period in the history of Western philosophy Contemporary philosophy is the present period in the history of Western philosophy beginning at the early 20th century with the increasing professionalization of the discipline and the rise of analytic and continental philosophy.[1] The phrase "contemporary philosophy" is a piece of technical terminology in philosophy that refers to a specific period in the history of Western philosophy (namely the philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries).[2] However, the phrase is often confused with modern philosophy (which refers to an earlier period in Western philosophy), postmodern philosophy (which refers to some philosophers' criticisms of modern philosophy), and with a non-technical use of the phrase referring to any recent philosophic work. Professionalization[edit] ...the day of the philosopher as isolated thinker – the talented amateur with an idiosyncratic message – is effectively gone. Process[edit] Professional philosophy today[edit]
Qualia In philosophy, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are what some consider to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term "qualia" derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind"). Examples of qualia include the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes".[1] Daniel Dennett (b. 1942), American philosopher and cognitive scientist, regards qualia as "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".[2] Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: The sensation of color cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Definitions[edit] Arguments for the existence of qualia[edit] E. J.
Hegel's Philosophy of History Back to main page The philosophy of history espoused by George Frederick Hegel, philosopher and historian, has often been viewed as largely teleological. It has often been speculated that this philosophical presumption arose from the historical context of Hegel's life, whether negatively through his fear of the French Terror or positively from his dedication to the Romantic thesis that Reason shapes the universe. Nonetheless, Hegel's commitment to the dialectical progression of time and to the triumphant end of history is taken to be a largely deterministic and ahistorical philosophy. Hegel as a determinist It is not difficult to see how this interpretation of Hegel arose. Spirit does not toss itself about in the external play of chance occurrences; on the contrary, it is that which determines history absolutely, and it stands firm against the chance occurrences which it dominates and exploits for its own purpose. The Hegelian dialectic The role of contingency
Phenomenology (philosophy) Phenomenology (from Greek: phainómenon "that which appears" and lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany. It then spread to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's early work.[1] Phenomenology, in Husserl's conception, is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. This ontology (study of reality) can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another. There are several assumptions behind phenomenology that help explain its foundations.
Jerusalem Prize The Jerusalem Prize for the Freedom of the Individual in Society is a biennial literary award given to writers whose works have dealt with themes of human freedom in society.[1] It is awarded at the Jerusalem International Book Fair, and the recipient usually delivers an address when accepting the award. The award is valued at $10,000, a modest amount that "reflects that it was never intended to be anything more than a symbolic sum."[1] The prize's inaugural year was 1963, awarded to Bertrand Russell who had won the Nobel Prize in 1950. Octavio Paz, V. S. In the intervening even-numbered years there is also a National Jerusalem Prize to promote local Israeli authors. List of Laureates[edit] References[edit] External links[edit] Jerusalem Prize at the Jerusalem Book Fair
Mental substance From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Mental substance, according to the idea held by dualists and idealists, is a non-physical substance of which minds are composed. This substance is often referred to as consciousness. This is opposed to the materialists, who hold that what we normally think of as mental substance is ultimately physical matter (i.e., brains). Descartes, who was most famous for the assertion "I think therefore I am", has had a lot of influence on the mind–body problem. He describes his theory of mental substance (which he calls res cogitans distinguishing it from the res extensa) in the Second Meditation (II.8) and in Principia Philosophiae (2.002). He used a more precise definition of the word "substance" than is currently popular: that a substance is something which can exist without the existence of any other substance. According to Descartes, God first created eternal truths and then the world from nothing, governing it with His divine providence. See also[edit]
Information Philosopher - Introduction Introduction The Information Philosopher has established that quantum mechanics and thermodynamics play a central role in the creation of all things. This finding has enormous implications for philosophy and metaphysics. Instead of a closed universe that is winding down deterministically from an initial state of high information, we find the universe is open and increasing information indeterministically from an initial state of relatively high entropy and low information. Information is being continuously created in the universe, not least by human beings who are just learning that they are part of the cosmic creative process. An open indeterministic universe with increasing information suggests three testable philosophical ideas: a model for free will and creativity that may satisfy determinists and libertarians a value system based on providential processes in the universe an epistemological explanation of knowledge formation and communication. Man is Free. For Teachers For Scholars