Reductionism

The Oxford Companion to Philosophy The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995; second edition 2005) is a reference work in philosophy edited by Ted Honderich and published by Oxford University Press. The second edition included some 300 new entries. The new edition has over 2,200 entries and 291 contributors. Publication history[edit] Honderich, Ted (ed.). References[edit] Spurrett, David (Nov 1996). External links[edit] The OUP page for the Oxford Companion to Philosophy second edition Reductionism in Biology, SEOP First published Tue May 27, 2008; substantive revision Mon Apr 30, 2012 Reductionism encompasses a set of ontological, epistemological, and methodological claims about the relations between different scientific domains. The basic question of reduction is whether the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from one scientific domain (typically at higher levels of organization) can be deduced from or explained by the properties, concepts, explanations, or methods from another domain of science (typically one about lower levels of organization). Reduction is germane to a variety of issues in philosophy of science, including the structure of scientific theories, the relations between different scientific disciplines, the nature of explanation, the diversity of methodology, and the very idea of theoretical progress, as well as to numerous topics in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, such as emergence, mereology, and supervenience. 1. 2.

Social cognitive neuroscience Use of neuroscience in study of social cognition Social cognitive neuroscience is the scientific study of the biological processes underpinning social cognition. Specifically, it uses the tools of neuroscience to study "the mental mechanisms that create, frame, regulate, and respond to our experience of the social world".[1] Social cognitive neuroscience uses the epistemological foundations of cognitive neuroscience, and is closely related to social neuroscience.[2] Social cognitive neuroscience employs human neuroimaging, typically using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). History and methods[edit] Functional anatomy[edit] Mirror neuron system (MNS)[edit] Mechanistic theories of MNS functioning fall broadly into two camps: motor and cognitive theories. Premotor cortex[edit] Intraparietal sulcus[edit] Lateral occipitotemporal cortex (LOTC)[edit] Default mode network (DMN)[edit] Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC)[edit] Posterior cingulate cortex (PCC)[edit] Other regions[edit] Insula[edit]

Statement Statement or statements may refer to: Reductionism,IEOP Reductionists are those who take one theory or phenomenon to be reducible to some other theory or phenomenon. For example, a reductionist regarding mathematics might take any given mathematical theory to be reducible to logic or set theory. Or, a reductionist about biological entities like cells might take such entities to be reducible to collections of physico-chemical entities like atoms and molecules. The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics. This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena. The bulk of this article will discuss this latter understanding of reductionism. In the twentieth century, most philosophers considered the question of the reduction of theories to be prior to the question of the reduction of entities or phenomena. Table of Contents 1. a. b. Therefore, c. 2. a.

Reality Not to be confused with Realty. Philosophers, mathematicians, and other ancient and modern thinkers, such as Aristotle, Plato, Frege, Wittgenstein, and Russell, have made a distinction between thought corresponding to reality, coherent abstractions (thoughts of things that are imaginable but not real), and that which cannot even be rationally thought. By contrast existence is often restricted solely to that which has physical existence or has a direct basis in it in the way that thoughts do in the brain. Reality is often contrasted with what is imaginary, delusional, (only) in the mind, dreams, what is false, what is fictional, or what is abstract. At the same time, what is abstract plays a role both in everyday life and in academic research. For instance, causality, virtue, life, and distributive justice are abstract concepts that can be difficult to define, but they are only rarely equated with pure delusions. The truth refers to what is real, while falsity refers to what is not. Being

Equality From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search Equality may refer to: Law and Society[edit] Mathematics[edit] Logic[edit] Logical equality Places[edit] See also[edit] For All Practical Purposes Usually, when a physicist makes an approximation - which can't be justified on rigorous grounds - he tends to justify it by saying that the results obtained are good for all practical purposes (FAPP), meaning that they agree with our experience and approximation errors cannot be detected in practical measurements (for instance, if the error is smaller than the measurement resolution). FAPP theories are incomplete or lackly-based theories that nevertheless have very high agreement with experiments and tend to be very useful for all practical purposes.

Social epidemiology From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Field of study While epidemiology is "the study of the distribution and determinants of states of health in populations", social epidemiology is "that branch of epidemiology concerned with the way that social structures, institutions, and relationships influence health Although health research is often organized by disease categories or organ systems, theoretical development in social epidemiology is typically organized around factors that influence health (i.e., health determinants rather than health outcomes). For example, questions of interest to epidemiologists include:[citation needed] Why have racial and economic inequalities in premature mortality persisted for generations even as the specific diseases causing premature death have completely changed?

Ted Honderich Ted Honderich (born 30 January 1933) is a Canadian-born British philosopher, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London.[1] His work has been mainly about five things: consciousness and mind, including the consciousness–brain relation; right and wrong in the contemporary world particularly with democracy, terrorism and war; advocacy of the Principle of Humanity; determinism and freedom; particular problems in logical analysis and metaphysics; the supposed justification of punishment by the state; the political tradition of conservatism. He has given lectures and talks in British, continental European, Irish, American, Canadian, Asian, Russian, and African universities. Biography[edit] Honderich was born Edgar Dawn Ross Honderich on 30 January 1933 in Baden, Ontario, Canada. His papers in philosophical journals have been published in three volumes by Edinburgh University Press. Consciousness[edit] Determinism and freedom[edit] Punishment[edit]

Housing Secretary: “the worst rental affordability crisis that this country has ever known" Earlier this week, Zillow released a study showing just how widespread the problem is. An analysis for The New York Times by Zillow, the real estate website, found 90 cities where the median rent — not including utilities — was more than 30 percent of the median gross income. Nationally, half of all renters are now spending more than 30 percent of their income on housing, according to a comprehensive Harvard study, up from 38 percent of renters in 2000. Things are expected to continue getting worse, as rents will outpace the rate of inflation (not to mention incomes) for years to come. What is going on? Why is no one paying attention to this growing crisis? First of all, let's remember what a healthy housing market looks like. This is not what is happening today. First-time homebuyers only account for 26% of home sales in January. Even those lucky enough to get mortgages are encountering the exact same abuses we saw during the recent housing bubble. Why is housing activity not recovering?

Quasiparticle Concept in condensed matter physics In condensed matter physics, a quasiparticle is a concept used to describe a collective behavior of a group of particles that can be treated as if they were a single particle. Formally, quasiparticles and collective excitations are closely related phenomena that arise when a microscopically complicated system such as a solid behaves as if it contained different weakly interacting particles in vacuum. These phenomena are typically called quasiparticles if they are related to fermions, and called collective excitations if they are related to bosons,[1] although the precise distinction is not universally agreed upon.[3] Thus, electrons and electron holes (fermions) are typically called quasiparticles, while phonons and plasmons (bosons) are typically called collective excitations. The quasiparticle concept is important in condensed matter physics because it can simplify the many-body problem in quantum mechanics. Overview[edit] General introduction[edit] L.

Symbol A red octagon symbolizes "stop" even without the word. A symbol is an object that represents, stands for, or suggests an idea, visual image, belief, action, or material entity. Symbols take the form of words, sounds, gestures, or visual images and are used to convey ideas and beliefs. For example, a red octagon may be a symbol for "STOP". On a map, a picture of a tent might represent a campsite. Numerals are symbols for numbers. Etymology[edit] The word derives from the Greek symbolon meaning token or watchword. Definitions[edit] In considering the effect of a symbol on the psyche, in his seminal essay The Symbol without Meaning Joseph Campbell proposes the following definition: A symbol is an energy evoking, and directing, agent.[2] Later, expanding on what he means by this definition Campbell says: "a symbol, like everything else, shows a double aspect. Heinrich Zimmer gives a concise overview of the nature, and perennial relevance, of symbols. Symbols and semiotics[edit] Paul Tillich[edit]

Social neuroscience Interdisciplinary field Social neuroscience is an interdisciplinary field devoted to understanding the relationship between social experiences and biological systems. Humans are fundamentally a social species, rather than solitary. As such, Homo sapiens create emergent organizations beyond the individual—structures that range from dyads, families, and groups to cities, civilizations, and cultures. In this regard, studies indicate that various social influences including life events, poverty, unemployment and loneliness can influence health related biomarkers.[1][2][3] The term "social neuroscience" can be traced to a publication entitled "Social Neuroscience Bulletin" that was published quarterly between 1988 and 1994. The term was subsequently popularized in an article by John Cacioppo and Gary Berntson, published in the American Psychologist in 1992.[4] Cacioppo and Berntson are considered as the legitimate fathers of social neuroscience. Overview[edit] Methods[edit] See also[edit]