Thomas Szasz Thomas Stephen Szasz (/ˈsɑːs/ SAHSS; April 15, 1920 – September 8, 2012)[2] was a psychiatrist and academic. Since 1990[3] he had been professor emeritus of psychiatry at the State University of New York Upstate Medical University in Syracuse. He was a well-known social critic of the moral and scientific foundations of psychiatry, and of the social control aims of medicine in modern society, as well as of scientism. Szasz argued that mental illnesses are not real in the sense that cancers are real. His views on special treatment followed from libertarian roots which are based on the principles that each person has the right to bodily and mental self-ownership and the right to be free from violence from others, although he criticized the "Free World" as well as the communist states for their use of psychiatry. Life[edit] Szasz was born to Jewish parents Gyula and Lily Szász on April 15, 1920, in Budapest, Hungary. The rise of Szasz's arguments[edit] Szasz's main arguments[edit]
Rational fideism Rational fideism is the philosophical view that considers faith to be precursor for any reliable knowledge. Every paradigmatic system, whether one considers rationalism or empiricism, is based on axioms that are neither self-founding nor self-evident (see the Münchhausen trilemma), so it appeals to assumptions accepted as belief (in reason or experience respectively). Thus, faith is basic to knowability. On the other hand, such a conclusion is reached not with an act of faith but with reasoning, a rational argumentation. "Rational fideism" has been defined variously. The following are some definitions. For Joseph Glanvill rational fideism is the view that "Faith, and faith alone, is the basis for our belief in our reason. Richard Popkin sees rational fideism as the opposite of "pure, blind, fideism".[2] Similarly, Domenic Marbaniang sees rational fideism as "the view that the knowledge of God can be certified through faith alone that is based on a revelation that is rationally verified
Pre-industrial society Pre-industrial society refers to specific social attributes and forms of political and cultural organization that were prevalent before the advent of the Industrial Revolution, which occurred from 1750 to 1850. It is followed by the industrial society. Some attributes of the pre-industrial societies[edit] Limited production (i.e. artisanship vs. mass production)Primarily an agricultural economyLimited division of labor. See also[edit] Bibliography[edit] Daniel R. Grinin, L. 2007.
Is Logic Empirical? "Is Logic Empirical?" is the title of two articles (one by Hilary Putnam and another by Michael Dummett)[1][2] that discuss the idea that the algebraic properties of logic may, or should, be empirically determined; in particular, they deal with the question of whether empirical facts about quantum phenomena may provide grounds for revising classical logic as a consistent logical rendering of reality. The replacement derives from the work of Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann on quantum logic. In their work, they showed that the outcomes of quantum measurements can be represented as binary propositions and that these quantum mechanical propositions can be combined in a similar way as propositions in classical logic. However, the algebraic properties of this structure are somewhat different from those of classical propositional logic in that the principle of distributivity fails. What is the epistemological status of the laws of logic? First article: Hilary Putnam [edit] ^ Putnam, H.
Occupy Wall Street Movement Part 1: Occupy Wall Street movement: The background of the spark to talk that millions have been waiting for It has been 3 weeks already so time is ripe for a first report on this historic process (sorry Wisconsin). This well may turn into a few part series. As explained in a January article Economic Development Alternatives for United States, the fusionistic groundswell of dissident movements will start shopping for ideas on moving forward. Ron Paul's 19th century reactionaries (and the oligarch backed crypto-fascist republican flavored tea party that co-opted and grew around them) obviously do not provide any real framework when it comes to replacing the current imperial regime of finance capital. Being against something is not being for and therefore it was only a matter of time until the youthful intelligentsia provided another tea party type movement (only from the "left" this time if you're helped by a reference to that dead paradigm). This is different.
Essays in Radical Empiricism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia By William James for his students Essays in Radical Empiricism (ERE) by William James is a collection edited and published posthumously by his colleague and biographer Ralph Barton Perry in 1912. It was assembled from ten out of a collection of twelve reprinted journal articles published from 1904–1905 which James had deposited in August, 1906, at the Harvard University Library and the Harvard Department of Philosophy for supplemental use by his students. Perry replaced two essays from the original list with two others, one of which didn't exist at the earlier time. Because ERE is a collection of essays written over a period of time, and ultimately not selected or collated by their author, it is not a systematic exposition of his thought[1] even though Perry suggests otherwise in his preface. Unpublished 1906 collection [edit] "Does Consciousness Exist?" James' plans for a book on radical empiricism based on this list never came to fruition.
John Beebe John Beebe (born June 24, 1939, Washington, D.C.) is a Jungian analyst in practice in San Francisco. He received degrees from Harvard College and the University of Chicago medical school. He is a past President of the C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco, where he is currently on the teaching faculty, as well as Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California Medical School, San Francisco. He is a Distinguished Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association. Professional interests and activities[edit] A popular lecturer in the Jungian world, Beebe has spoken on topics related to the theory and practical applications of analytical psychology to professional and lay audiences throughout the United States as well as in Canada, China, Denmark, England, France, Italy, Germany, Israel, Mexico, and Switzerland. Eight-function model[edit] Publications[edit] Psychiatric Treatment: Crisis, Clinic and Consultation, with C. Publications on psychological type[edit]
Psychological nominalism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Psychological nominalism is the view advanced in Wilfrid Sellars' 1956 paper "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind" (EPM) that explains psychological concepts in terms of public language use.[1] Sellars describes psychological nominalism as the view that “all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness…is a linguistic affair.”[2] Judging solely from the mention in EPM, psychological nominalism would seem to be a form of verbal behaviorism, which holds that ascriptions of psychological states are definitionally equivalent to predictions about behavior. For example, the verbal behaviorist holds that a statement like "John is scared of thunderstorms" is meaningful only insofar as it can be parsed into predictions concerning the sorts of things John is likely to say and/or do in the event of a thunderstorm (i.e.
Cognitive module A cognitive module is, in theories of the modularity of mind and the closely related society of mind theory, a specialised tool or sub-unit that can be used by other parts to resolve cognitive tasks. The question of their existence and nature is a major topic in cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. Some see cognitive modules as an independent part of the mind.[1] Others also see new thought patterns achieved by experience as cognitive modules.[2] Other theories similar to the cognitive module are cognitive description,[3] cognitive pattern[4] and psychological mechanism. Examples[edit] Some examples of cognitive modules: Psychological disorders – cognitive modules run amok[edit] Many common psychological and personality disorders are caused by cognitive modules running amok. Paranoia:[29] Being suspicious of fellow human beings is a trait to safeguard against perceived, secret plots against us, a basic human cognitive module useful for survival. Memory and creative thought[edit]
Open texture From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Philosophical term introduced by Friedrich Waismann Open texture is a term in the philosophy of Friedrich Waismann, first introduced in his paper Verifiability to refer to the universal possibility of vagueness in empirical statements.[1] It is an application of some of the ideas of posited by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, particularly Section 80.[2] The concept has become important in criticism of verificationism and has also found use in legal philosophy. In legal philosophy, open texture reinforces the notion that vagueness is an inevitable feature of legal languages.[3] Legal philosophers who subscribe to Waismann's view believe that such "vagueness" solves the conceptual confusions of ordinary language.[3] According to H.L.A.
Cognitive model A cognitive model is an approximation to animal cognitive processes (predominantly human) for the purposes of comprehension and prediction. Cognitive models can be developed within or without a cognitive architecture, though the two are not always easily distinguishable. History[edit] Cognitive modeling historically developed within cognitive psychology/cognitive science (including human factors), and has received contributions from the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence to name a few. There are many types of cognitive models, and they can range from box-and-arrow diagrams to a set of equations to software programs that interact with the same tools that humans use to complete tasks (e.g., computer mouse and keyboard). Box-and-arrow models[edit] A number of key terms are used to describe the processes involved in the perception, storage, and production of speech. Computational models[edit] Symbolic[edit] Subsymbolic[edit] Hybrid[edit] Dynamical systems[edit] Locomotion[edit]