Rational fideism Rational fideism is the philosophical view that considers faith to be precursor for any reliable knowledge. Every paradigmatic system, whether one considers rationalism or empiricism, is based on axioms that are neither self-founding nor self-evident (see the Münchhausen trilemma), so it appeals to assumptions accepted as belief (in reason or experience respectively). Thus, faith is basic to knowability. On the other hand, such a conclusion is reached not with an act of faith but with reasoning, a rational argumentation. "Rational fideism" has been defined variously. The following are some definitions. For Joseph Glanvill rational fideism is the view that "Faith, and faith alone, is the basis for our belief in our reason. Richard Popkin sees rational fideism as the opposite of "pure, blind, fideism".[2] Similarly, Domenic Marbaniang sees rational fideism as "the view that the knowledge of God can be certified through faith alone that is based on a revelation that is rationally verified
Is Logic Empirical? "Is Logic Empirical?" is the title of two articles (one by Hilary Putnam and another by Michael Dummett)[1][2] that discuss the idea that the algebraic properties of logic may, or should, be empirically determined; in particular, they deal with the question of whether empirical facts about quantum phenomena may provide grounds for revising classical logic as a consistent logical rendering of reality. The replacement derives from the work of Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann on quantum logic. In their work, they showed that the outcomes of quantum measurements can be represented as binary propositions and that these quantum mechanical propositions can be combined in a similar way as propositions in classical logic. However, the algebraic properties of this structure are somewhat different from those of classical propositional logic in that the principle of distributivity fails. What is the epistemological status of the laws of logic? First article: Hilary Putnam [edit] ^ Putnam, H.
Essays in Radical Empiricism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia By William James for his students Essays in Radical Empiricism (ERE) by William James is a collection edited and published posthumously by his colleague and biographer Ralph Barton Perry in 1912. It was assembled from ten out of a collection of twelve reprinted journal articles published from 1904–1905 which James had deposited in August, 1906, at the Harvard University Library and the Harvard Department of Philosophy for supplemental use by his students. Perry replaced two essays from the original list with two others, one of which didn't exist at the earlier time. Because ERE is a collection of essays written over a period of time, and ultimately not selected or collated by their author, it is not a systematic exposition of his thought[1] even though Perry suggests otherwise in his preface. Unpublished 1906 collection [edit] "Does Consciousness Exist?" James' plans for a book on radical empiricism based on this list never came to fruition.
Psychological nominalism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Psychological nominalism is the view advanced in Wilfrid Sellars' 1956 paper "Empiricism and Philosophy of Mind" (EPM) that explains psychological concepts in terms of public language use.[1] Sellars describes psychological nominalism as the view that “all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness…is a linguistic affair.”[2] Judging solely from the mention in EPM, psychological nominalism would seem to be a form of verbal behaviorism, which holds that ascriptions of psychological states are definitionally equivalent to predictions about behavior. For example, the verbal behaviorist holds that a statement like "John is scared of thunderstorms" is meaningful only insofar as it can be parsed into predictions concerning the sorts of things John is likely to say and/or do in the event of a thunderstorm (i.e.
Open texture From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Philosophical term introduced by Friedrich Waismann Open texture is a term in the philosophy of Friedrich Waismann, first introduced in his paper Verifiability to refer to the universal possibility of vagueness in empirical statements.[1] It is an application of some of the ideas of posited by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, particularly Section 80.[2] The concept has become important in criticism of verificationism and has also found use in legal philosophy. In legal philosophy, open texture reinforces the notion that vagueness is an inevitable feature of legal languages.[3] Legal philosophers who subscribe to Waismann's view believe that such "vagueness" solves the conceptual confusions of ordinary language.[3] According to H.L.A.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Philosophical work by John Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a work by John Locke concerning the foundation of human knowledge and understanding. It first appeared in 1689 (although dated 1690) with the printed title An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding. The main thesis is that there are "No Innate Principles." Whereas Book I is intended to reject the doctrine of innate ideas proposed by Descartes and the rationalists, Book II explains that every idea is derived from experience either by sensation—i.e. direct sensory information—or reflection—i.e. In Book II, Locke focuses on the ideas of substances and qualities, in which the former are "an unknown support of qualities" and latter have the "power to produce ideas in our mind In terms of qualities, Locke divides such into primary and secondary, whereby the former give our minds ideas based on sensation and actual experience. Furthermore, Book II is also a systematic argument for the existence of an intelligent being:
Constructive empiricism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Form of empiricism in philosophy of science Bas van Fraassen is nearly solely responsible for the initial development of constructive empiricism; its historically most important presentation appears in his The Scientific Image (1980). Constructive empiricism states that scientific theories are semantically literal, that they aim to be empirically adequate, and that their acceptance involves, as belief, only that they are empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate if and only if everything that it says about observable entities is true (regardless of what it says about unobservable entities). Constructive empiricism opposes scientific realism, logical positivism (or logical empiricism) and instrumentalism. Constructive empiricism has been used to analyze various scientific fields, from physics to psychology (especially computational psychology).
Empirical evidence Knowledge acquired by means of the senses Empirical evidence for a proposition is evidence, i.e. what supports or counters this proposition, that is constituted by or accessible to sense experience or experimental procedure. Empirical evidence is of central importance to the sciences and plays a role in various other fields, like epistemology and law. Scientific evidence is closely related to empirical evidence but not all forms of empirical evidence meet the standards dictated by scientific methods. Some philosophers restrict evidence even further, for example, to only conscious, propositional or factive mental states.[2] Restricting evidence to conscious mental states has the implausible consequence that many simple everyday beliefs would be unjustified. A thing is evidence for a proposition if it epistemically supports this proposition or indicates that the supported proposition is true. Knowledge a posteriori and a priori [edit] Empiricism and rationalism Scientific evidence
Sense data Theory in the philosophy of perception The theory of sense data is a view in the philosophy of perception, popularly held in the early 20th century by philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, C. D. Broad, H. H. Sense data are often placed in a time and/or causality series, such that they occur after the potential unreliability of our perceptual systems yet before the possibility of error during higher-level conceptual analysis and are thus incorrigible. Talk of sense-data has since been largely replaced by talk of the closely related qualia. Bertrand Russell heard the sound of his knuckles rapping his writing table, felt the table's hardness and saw its apparent colour (which he knew 'really' to be the brown of wood) change significantly under shifting lighting conditions. H. When we twist a coin it 'appears' to us as elliptical. Consider a reflection which appears to us in a mirror. The nature of sense data [edit] Abstract sense data "Sense data".
Quasi-empiricism in mathematics Quasi-empiricism in mathematics is the attempt in the philosophy of mathematics to direct philosophers' attention to mathematical practice, in particular, relations with physics, social sciences, and computational mathematics, rather than solely to issues in the foundations of mathematics. Of concern to this discussion are several topics: the relationship of empiricism (see Penelope Maddy) with mathematics, issues related to realism, the importance of culture, necessity of application, etc. A primary argument with respect to quasi-empiricism is that whilst mathematics and physics are frequently considered to be closely linked fields of study, this may reflect human cognitive bias. Eugene Wigner (1960)[1] noted that this culture need not be restricted to mathematics, physics, or even humans. "We see what we look for." For Willard Van Orman Quine (1960),[3] existence is only existence in a structure. Operational aspects [edit] Several recent works pertain to this topic.
Sensualism From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Epistemological position In epistemology, sensualism is a doctrine whereby sensations and perception are the basic and most important form of true cognition. It may oppose abstract ideas.[1]