Jihadism is on the move in Mali - why this matters to western countries. Opinion Updated Last Wednesday, a suicide bomber linked to one of Al-Qaeda's North African affiliates detonated a vehicle filled with explosives inside a military barracks in the Malian town of Gao. Jihadist violence is not uncommon in the country's north but the death toll for this attack, at 77, was unprecedented – even amidst the current climate of insecurity. Even though suicide bombers have hit Malian targets before, the January 18 bombing in Gao was demonstrative of a new trend in Malian jihadism: movement. While an identical attack would not be surprising if it had been carried out by a disaffected local in a Saharan border town further north, the Gao bombing is the latest in a series of events which indicate that jihadism is on the move in the country. This process has been nebulous and subtle, but the spread into central and even southern Mali has been ongoing for the last two years even if, for the most part, it has escaped much of the world's attention.
AQMI et Al-Mourabitoun : le djihad sahélien réunifié? Cette alliance, qui intervient trois ans après le départ de Belmokhtar d’AQMI, interroge à bien des égards. Pourquoi Droukdel, qui avait destitué Belmokhtar de sa brigade en octobre 2012, a-t-il souhaité le voir rejoindre de nouveau l’organisation ? À la tête d’un des mouvements djihadistes les plus puissants du Sahel, quels intérêts poursuit à l’inverse Belmokhtar en réintégrant la hiérarchie de sa maison d’origine, alors affaiblie par plusieurs années d’opération militaire franco-africaine ? Quelle place et quelles garanties a-t-il obtenu ? Comment s’intègrent Al-Mourabitoun et son émir Belmokhtar dans la structure organisationnelle d’AQMI ?
Afin d’apporter des éléments de réponses à ces questions, cette étude revient sur des problématiques plus larges, de la recomposition des forces djihadistes dans l’espace sahélien à la lutte d’influence opposant AQMI à l’État islamique (EI), du Sahel à la Libye jusqu’au front syro-irakien. Mali's Persistent Jihadist Problem. Four years ago, French forces intervened in Mali, successfully averting an al Qaeda-backed thrust toward the capital of Bamako. The French operation went a long way toward reducing the threat that multiple jihadist groups posed to this West Africa nation. The situation in Mali today remains tenuous, however, and the last 18 months have seen a gradual erosion of France's impressive, initial gains. To ensure a significant new threat does not materialize in Mali again, France will need staying power — and support from other countries, including the United States.
The 2013 French intervention in Mali rid the country of what French security experts referred to as “Malistan” — a huge al Qaeda safe haven in the northern half of the country that had grown increasingly reminiscent of Afghanistan on the eve of the 9/11 attacks. Training the Malian army and preventing the resurgence of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups in Mali, however, has been a tough and often frustrating task. Christopher S. Jeffrey Feltman : « Daesh et Boko Haram se nourrissent des problèmes de mauvaise gouvernance » Présent au Tchad à l'occasion du sommet des chefs d'État du G5 (Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mauritanie, Tchad), le 20 novembre, Jeffrey Feltman, secrétaire général adjoint aux affaires politiques de l'ONU, a répondu aux questions de Jeune Afrique. Jeune Afrique : L’attaque de Bamako du 20 novembre montre que l’Afrique est en première ligne dans la lutte contre le terrorisme.
Comment l’aider ? Jeffrey Feltman : Ces événements, que je condamne avec fermeté au nom des Nations unies, sont un nouvel exemple de la nécessité de travailler ensemble contre le terrorisme : l’Afrique, l’ONU, le monde entier. Le terrorisme n’est pas un phénomène isolé dans une partie du monde. Nous devons le combattre à différents niveaux. Il doit y avoir des mesures militaires et sécuritaires, mais aussi un véritable effort pour analyser les causes de l’extrémisme violent, de la radicalisation, qui mènent au terrorisme.
La coopération entre les pays du Sahel est-elle suffisante ? Vous évoquez la Libye. Vincent Duhem. Niger: la mission européenne de lutte contre le terrorisme sera renouvelée. Africa in Transition » Are U.S. Efforts Successfully Countering Terrorism in Africa? U.S. President Barack Obama (L) puts his arm around Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta as they depart after their joint news conference after their meeting at the State House in Nairobi, July 25, 2015. (Courtesy/Jonathan Ernst ) This post was co-authored by Cheryl Strauss Einhorn and Andrea Walther-Puri. Cheryl is an adjunct professor at Columbia Business School.
Andrea is a researcher focusing on security sector reform and a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. A key component of the U.S. strategy to counter terrorism (CT) focuses on working with weak states to combat violent extremist threats. Since 9/11, the U.S. has launched two CT partnerships in Africa, one to counter the effects of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram in the Maghreb and Sahel, and one to counter al-Shabab in East Africa. Part of the problem is that terrorism is not always a top priority for countries that have other more pressing problems.