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Japanese American internment

Japanese American internment
Japanese American internment was the World War II internment in "War Relocation Camps" of over 110,000 people of Japanese heritage who lived on the Pacific coast of the United States. The U.S. government ordered the internment in 1942, shortly after Imperial Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.[2][3] The internment of Japanese Americans was applied unequally as a geographic matter: all who lived on the West Coast were interned, while in Hawaii, where 150,000-plus Japanese Americans comprised over one-third of the population, only 1,200[4] to 1,800 were interned. Sixty-two percent of the internees were American citizens.[5][6] President Franklin D. After Pearl Harbor[edit] San Francisco Examiner, February 1942. A Japanese American unfurled this banner the day after the Pearl Harbor attack. Children at the Weill public school in San Francisco pledge allegiance to the American flag in April 1942, prior to the internment of Japanese Americans. Executive Order 9066 and related actions[edit]

1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), was a landmark decision from the United States Supreme Court dealing with the application of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution to private corporations. The case arose when the president of Dartmouth College was deposed by its trustees, leading to the New Hampshire legislature attempting to force the college to become a public institution and thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor. The Supreme Court upheld the sanctity of the original charter of the college, which pre-dated the creation of the State. The decision settled the nature of public versus private charters and resulted in the rise of the American business corporation and the free American enterprise system.[1] Background[edit] In 1769 King George III of Great Britain granted a charter to Dartmouth College. The trustees retained Dartmouth alumnus Daniel Webster, a New Hampshire native who would later become a U.S.

Japanese Canadian internment Beginning after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and lasting until 1949 (four years after World War II had ended) all persons of Japanese heritage were systematically removed from their homes and businesses and sent to internment camps. The Canadian government shut down all Japanese-language newspapers, took possession of businesses and fishing boats, and effectively sold them. In order to fund the internment itself, vehicles, houses and personal belongings were also sold.[3] In August 1944, Prime Minister Mackenzie King announced that Japanese Canadians were to move east as had been previously encouraged. Prewar history[edit] Tensions between Canadians and Japanese immigrants to Canada existed long before the outbreak of World War II. Starting as early as 1858, with the influx of "Orientals" during Fraser Canyon Gold Rush, negative beliefs and fears about Asian immigrants began to affect the populace in British Columbia. World War II[edit] Mackenzie King[edit]

Dartmouth College v. Woodward Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case dealing with the application of the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution to private corporations. The case arose when the president of Dartmouth College was deposed by its trustees, leading to the New Hampshire legislature attempting to force the college to become a public institution and thereby place the ability to appoint trustees in the hands of the governor. The Supreme Court upheld the sanctity of the original charter of the college, which pre-dated the creation of the State. Facts In 1769 King George III of England granted a charter to Dartmouth College. The trustees retained Dartmouth alumnus Daniel Webster, a New Hampshire native who would later become a U.S. Judgment Full article ▸

1886, Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) was a matter brought before the United States Supreme Court – but not decided by the court – which dealt with taxation of railroad properties. A report issued by the Court Reporter claimed to state the sense of the Court – without a decision or written opinions published by or of the Court. This was the first time that the Supreme Court was reported to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause granted constitutional protections to corporations as well as to natural persons, although numerous other cases, since Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819, have recognized that corporations were entitled to some of the protections of the Constitution. In the opinion, the Court consolidated three separate cases: History and legal dispute[edit] Headnote[edit] Bancroft Davis, the Court Reporter and former president of Newburgh and New York Railway Waite replied: C. Why did the chief justice issue his dictum?

Mere evidence rule, wikipedia In the law of the United States, the mere evidence rule was a historical doctrine that defined the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Origins[edit] Justice Bradley laid the foundation for the mere evidence rule with a broad interpretation of the 4th Amendment in Boyd v. United States. The mere evidence rule was drawn from the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case Boyd v. United States.[1] In Boyd, the Court ruled that a statute that compelled the production of documents as part of an investigation into the payment of duties was a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The mere evidence rule was solidified in the case Gouled v. The mere evidence rule was praised as a valuable protection of individual privacy. Demise[edit] Justice Brennan rejected the mere evidence rule in Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. By the beginning of the twentieth century the mere evidence rule was facing criticism. References[edit] Jump up ^ Stanton D.

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 370 (1906) The Supreme Court established in Hale v. Henkel the power of a federal grand jury investigation into corporate misconduct to require an organization to turn over its records. Hale was an officer of MacAndrews and Forbes Company, one of six companies being investigated for illegal price fixing of tobacco. A federal grand jury subpoena addressed to Hale required him to produce extensive corporate records, and he refused. The Court rejected Hale’s argument that a grand jury cannot compel the production of records without first providing a list of charges being investigated, holding that a grand jury can initiate an investigation of potential crimes on its own volition without identifying the scope of its investigation before examining witnesses and compelling the production of documentary evidence. This broad inquisitorial power permits a grand jury to first investigate misconduct before deciding whether to approve an indictment. References and Further Reading LaFave, Wayne R., Jerold H.

1919, Dodge v. Ford Motor Company Dodge v. Ford Motor Company[1] is a case in which the Michigan Supreme Court held that Henry Ford owed a duty to the shareholders of the Ford Motor Company to operate his business to profit his shareholders, rather than the community as a whole or employees. It is often cited as embodying the principle of "shareholder value" in companies. For a more recent case, see AP Smith Manufacturing Co v. Barlow 39 ALR 2d 1179 (1953) or Shlensky v. Facts[edit] By 1916, the Ford Motor Company had accumulated a capital surplus of $60 million. While Ford may have believed that such a strategy might be in the long-term benefit of the company, he told his fellow shareholders that the value of this strategy to them was not a primary consideration in his plans. The Court was called upon to decide whether the minority shareholders could prevent Ford from operating the company for the charitable ends that he had declared. Judgment[edit] Significance[edit] See also[edit] Grimshaw v. Notes[edit]

1922. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that whether a regulatory act constitutes a taking requiring compensation depends on the extent of diminution in the value of the property. The decision thereby started the doctrine of regulatory taking. The Takings Clause originally applied only when the government physically seized or occupied property. Prior to 1922, American courts followed a clear rule: regulation of land was not a taking. Pennsylvania Coal also established the diminution-of-value test, in contrast to other tests, such as the permanent physical occupations test (Loretto v. Parties[edit] Plaintiff/Respondent: H.J. Defendant/Petitioner: Pennsylvania Coal Co., owner of mining rights to parcel of land. Background[edit] State of law[edit] In the late 19th century, the modern regulatory state was developing and the "scope of police regulation" was broadened. At the time this case was decided Mugler v.

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon View this case and other resources at: Citation. 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158, 67 L. Brief Fact Summary. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Facts. Issue. Page: Content Type:

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