Theory of Knowledge » The Tripartite Theory of Knowledge There is a tradition that goes back as far as Plato that holds that three conditions must be satisfied in order for one to possess knowledge. This account, known as the tripartite theory of knowledge, analyses knowledge as justified true belief. The tripartite theory says that if you believe something, with justification, and it is true, then you know it; otherwise, you do not. Belief The first condition for knowledge, according to the tripartite theory, is belief. Unless one believes a thing, one cannot know it. Truth The second condition for knowledge, according to the tripartite theory, is truth. Justification The third condition for knowledge is justification. The tripartite theory of knowledge is intuitively very plausible. Theory of Knowledge » Knowledge Without Belief? According to the tripartite theory of knowledge, knowledge is justified true belief. One proposed counter-example to this theory is the case of the nervous student. This is supposedly a case of knowledge without belief, thus showing that it is possible to have knowledge without satisfying all three of the tripartite theory’s conditions for knowledge, that those conditions are not necessary conditions for knowledge. The case of the nervous student is as follows: A student in a history class has been taught that the Battle of Hastings took place in 1066. It seems that the student does know that the Battle of Hastings took place in 1066. However, it also seems that the student does not believe that it occurred in 1066. The nervous student thus appears to have knowledge without belief.
Theory of Knowledge » What is Knowledge? People use the word “know” all the time, but what does it mean? Most of us feel that we have an intuitive grasp of the concept, but providing a more rigorous analysis of it is difficult. Types of Knowledge Philosophers typically divide knowledge into three types: personal knowledge, procedural knowledge, and propositional knowledge. The primary concern of epistemology is propositional knowledge, but contrasting this with other types of knowledge can help in clarifying precisely what it is that epistemologists are discussing. Theories of Knowledge The most popular account of knowledge is the tripartite theory. The closest thing to a rival to the tripartite theory is infallibilism, which suggests that knowledge requires absolute certainty, as opposed to belief or opinion about which there is more doubt.
Theory of Knowledge » Gettier Cases The tripartite theory of knowledge analyses knowledge as justified true belief. According to this analysis, if something is true, and we believe it to be true, and we are justified in believing it to be true, then we know it. The tripartite theory, though it has been around since Plato, and though it is still widely used by many philosophers as a working model of knowledge, is false. This was shown to the satisfaction of most philosophers by Edmond Gettier, who developed what are now known as “Gettier cases”. Gettier cases are cases in which the tripartite theory’s three conditions for knowledge are satisfied, i.e. in which a person does have a justified true belief, but in which there is no knowledge. Suppose that two students, Mark and Sam, have taken a test. Sam, however, does not know this. Unknown to Sam, though, he does share a name with the author of “The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.”
The Analysis of Knowledge 1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:S knows that p iff p is true; S believes that p; S is justified in believing that p. The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”. Socrates articulates the need for something like a justification condition in Plato's Theaetetus, when he points out that ‘true opinion’ is in general insufficient for knowledge. Before turning to influential twentieth-century arguments against the JTB theory, let us briefly consider the three traditional components of knowledge in turn. 1.1 The Truth Condition Condition (i), the truth condition, is largely uncontroversial. Hazlett (2010) argues that “knows” is not a factive verb, on the basis of the apparent felicity of utterances like: 1.2 The Belief Condition A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford (1966). 2. 3.
Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus 1. Introduction The Theaetetus, which probably dates from about 369 BC, is arguably Plato's greatest work on epistemology. (Arguably, it is his greatest work on anything.) Plato (c.427–347 BC) has much to say about the nature of knowledge elsewhere. But only the Theaetetus offers a set-piece discussion of the question “What is knowledge?” Like many other Platonic dialogues, the Theaetetus is dominated by question-and-answer exchanges, with Socrates as main questioner. Also like other Platonic dialogues, the main discussion of the Theaetetus is set within a framing conversation (142a-143c) between Eucleides and Terpsion (cp. The Theaetetus’ most important similarity to other Platonic dialogues is that it is aporetic—it is a dialogue that ends in an impasse. This matters, given the place that the Theaetetus is normally assigned in the chronology of Plato's writings. 2. In 187b4–8, Theaetetus proposes a second definition of knowledge: (D2) “Knowledge is true belief.” 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Epistemology In this interview Miranda Fricker, author of a new book on the topic, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing , explains the notion of testimonial injustice. This is a special kind of injustice that arises when someone wrongly treats someone else as a poor source of information, usually because of prejudice towards a particular group. Listen to Miranda Fricker on Epistemic Injustice