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Analytic philosophy

Analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy (sometimes analytical philosophy) is a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. In the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand, the vast majority of university philosophy departments identify themselves as "analytic" departments.[1] The term "analytic philosophy" can refer to: A broad philosophical tradition[2][3] characterized by an emphasis on clarity and argument (often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language) and a respect for the natural sciences.[4][5][6]The more specific set of developments of early 20th-century philosophy that were the historical antecedents of the broad sense: e.g., the work of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. In this latter, narrower sense, analytic philosophy is identified with specific philosophical commitments (many of which are rejected by contemporary analytic philosophers), such as: History[edit] Logical positivism[edit] Related:  -The problems with philosophy

Qualia In philosophy, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are what some consider to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term "qualia" derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind"). Examples of qualia include the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes".[1] Daniel Dennett (b. 1942), American philosopher and cognitive scientist, regards qualia as "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".[2] Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: The sensation of color cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Definitions[edit] Arguments for the existence of qualia[edit] E. J.

Hegel's Philosophy of History Back to main page The philosophy of history espoused by George Frederick Hegel, philosopher and historian, has often been viewed as largely teleological. It has often been speculated that this philosophical presumption arose from the historical context of Hegel's life, whether negatively through his fear of the French Terror or positively from his dedication to the Romantic thesis that Reason shapes the universe. Nonetheless, Hegel's commitment to the dialectical progression of time and to the triumphant end of history is taken to be a largely deterministic and ahistorical philosophy. Hegel as a determinist It is not difficult to see how this interpretation of Hegel arose. Spirit does not toss itself about in the external play of chance occurrences; on the contrary, it is that which determines history absolutely, and it stands firm against the chance occurrences which it dominates and exploits for its own purpose. The Hegelian dialectic The role of contingency

20th-century philosophy Current period in the history of Western philosophy Contemporary philosophy is the present period in the history of Western philosophy beginning at the early 20th century with the increasing professionalization of the discipline and the rise of analytic and continental philosophy.[1] The phrase "contemporary philosophy" is a piece of technical terminology in philosophy that refers to a specific period in the history of Western philosophy (namely the philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries).[2] However, the phrase is often confused with modern philosophy (which refers to an earlier period in Western philosophy), postmodern philosophy (which refers to some philosophers' criticisms of modern philosophy), and with a non-technical use of the phrase referring to any recent philosophic work. Professionalization[edit] ...the day of the philosopher as isolated thinker – the talented amateur with an idiosyncratic message – is effectively gone. Process[edit] Professional philosophy today[edit]

Mental substance From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Mental substance, according to the idea held by dualists and idealists, is a non-physical substance of which minds are composed. This substance is often referred to as consciousness. This is opposed to the materialists, who hold that what we normally think of as mental substance is ultimately physical matter (i.e., brains). Descartes, who was most famous for the assertion "I think therefore I am", has had a lot of influence on the mind–body problem. He describes his theory of mental substance (which he calls res cogitans distinguishing it from the res extensa) in the Second Meditation (II.8) and in Principia Philosophiae (2.002). He used a more precise definition of the word "substance" than is currently popular: that a substance is something which can exist without the existence of any other substance. According to Descartes, God first created eternal truths and then the world from nothing, governing it with His divine providence. See also[edit]

Information Philosopher - Introduction Introduction The Information Philosopher has established that quantum mechanics and thermodynamics play a central role in the creation of all things. This finding has enormous implications for philosophy and metaphysics. Instead of a closed universe that is winding down deterministically from an initial state of high information, we find the universe is open and increasing information indeterministically from an initial state of relatively high entropy and low information. Information is being continuously created in the universe, not least by human beings who are just learning that they are part of the cosmic creative process. An open indeterministic universe with increasing information suggests three testable philosophical ideas: a model for free will and creativity that may satisfy determinists and libertarians a value system based on providential processes in the universe an epistemological explanation of knowledge formation and communication. Man is Free. For Teachers For Scholars

Jerusalem Prize The Jerusalem Prize for the Freedom of the Individual in Society is a biennial literary award given to writers whose works have dealt with themes of human freedom in society.[1] It is awarded at the Jerusalem International Book Fair, and the recipient usually delivers an address when accepting the award. The award is valued at $10,000, a modest amount that "reflects that it was never intended to be anything more than a symbolic sum."[1] The prize's inaugural year was 1963, awarded to Bertrand Russell who had won the Nobel Prize in 1950. Octavio Paz, V. S. In the intervening even-numbered years there is also a National Jerusalem Prize to promote local Israeli authors. List of Laureates[edit] References[edit] External links[edit] Jerusalem Prize at the Jerusalem Book Fair

Object From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Object may refer to: General meanings[edit] Science, technology, and mathematics[edit] Computing[edit] Mathematics[edit] Object (mathematics), an abstract object arising in mathematicsGroup object, a generalization of a group built on more complicated structures than setsObject, an entity treated by mathematical category theory Physics[edit] Physical body or object, in physics, an identifiable collection of matter Planetary body or planetary object, any secondary body in the Solar system that has a planet-like geology Other sciences[edit] Arts and media[edit] Other uses[edit] See also[edit] Topics referred to by the same term

Belief in Belief Followup to: Making Beliefs Pay Rent (in Anticipated Experiences) Carl Sagan once told a parable of a man who comes to us and claims: "There is a dragon in my garage." Fascinating! We reply that we wish to see this dragon—let us set out at once for the garage! "But wait," the claimant says to us, "it is an invisible dragon." Now as Sagan points out, this doesn't make the hypothesis unfalsifiable. But now suppose that we say to the claimant, "Okay, we'll visit the garage and see if we can hear heavy breathing," and the claimant quickly says no, it's an inaudible dragon. Carl Sagan used this parable to illustrate the classic moral that poor hypotheses need to do fast footwork to avoid falsification. Some philosophers have been much confused by such scenarios, asking, "Does the claimant really believe there's a dragon present, or not?" The rationalist virtue of empiricism is supposed to prevent us from this class of mistake. There's different kinds of belief in belief.

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