Indeterminism Indeterminism is the concept that events (certain events, or events of certain types) are not caused, or not caused deterministically (cf. causality) by prior events. It is the opposite of determinism and related to chance. It is highly relevant to the philosophical problem of free will, particularly in the form of metaphysical libertarianism. In science, most specifically quantum theory in physics, indeterminism is the belief that no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is a probability. Causation without determinism[edit] A number of philosophers have argued that lack of determinism does not entail absence of causation. Necessary but insufficient causation[edit] Indeterminists do not have to deny that causes exist. If x is a necessary cause of y; then the presence of y necessarily implies that x preceded it. If x is a sufficient cause of y, then the presence of x necessarily implies the presence of y. Probabilistic causation[edit] Philosophy[edit] Aristotle[edit] John D.
Determinism Determinism is the philosophical position that for every event, including human action, there exist conditions that could cause no other event. "There are many determinisms, depending upon what pre-conditions are considered to be determinative of an event."[1] Deterministic theories throughout the history of philosophy have sprung from diverse and sometimes overlapping motives and considerations. Some forms of determinism can be empirically tested with ideas from physics and the philosophy of physics. Other debates often concern the scope of determined systems, with some maintaining that the entire universe is a single determinate system and others identifying other more limited determinate systems (or multiverse). Varieties[edit] Below appear some of the more common viewpoints meant by, or confused with "determinism". Many philosophical theories of determinism frame themselves with the idea that reality follows a sort of predetermined path Philosophical connections[edit] History[edit]
Incompatibilism View of free will and determinism as incompatible and precluding each other Incompatibilists agree that determinism leaves no room for free will. As a result, they reject one or both. Incompatibilism is the view that a deterministic universe is completely at odds with the notion that persons have free will,[1] the latter being defined as the capacity of conscious agents to choose a future course of action among several available physical alternatives.[2] Thus, incompatibilism implies that there is a dichotomy between determinism and free will, where philosophers must support at most one or the other, not both. Incompatibilism is contrasted with compatibilism, which rejects the dichotomy between determinism and free will. Libertarianism[edit] Hard determinism[edit] Schopenhauer said "Man is free to do what he wills, but he cannot will what he wills." William James said that philosophers (and scientists) have an "antipathy to chance Moral implications[edit] Hard incompatibilism[edit]
Ted Honderich Ted Honderich (born 30 January 1933) is a Canadian-born British philosopher, Grote Professor Emeritus of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic, University College London.[1] His work has been mainly about five things: consciousness and mind, including the consciousness–brain relation; right and wrong in the contemporary world particularly with democracy, terrorism and war; advocacy of the Principle of Humanity; determinism and freedom; particular problems in logical analysis and metaphysics; the supposed justification of punishment by the state; the political tradition of conservatism. He has given lectures and talks in British, continental European, Irish, American, Canadian, Asian, Russian, and African universities. Biography[edit] Honderich was born Edgar Dawn Ross Honderich on 30 January 1933 in Baden, Ontario, Canada. His papers in philosophical journals have been published in three volumes by Edinburgh University Press. Consciousness[edit] Determinism and freedom[edit] Punishment[edit]
Free will Though it is a commonly held intuition that we have free will,[3] it has been widely debated throughout history not only whether that is true, but even how to define the concept of free will.[4] How exactly must the will be free, what exactly must the will be free from, in order for us to have free will? Historically, the constraint of dominant concern has been determinism of some variety (such as logical, nomological, or theological), so the two most prominent common positions are named incompatibilist or compatibilist for the relation they hold to exist between free will and determinism. In Western philosophy[edit] The underlying issue is: Do we have some control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent? On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads us to believe that we have free will.[13][14] On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken.[15][16] Incompatibilism[edit] Using T, F for "true" and "false" and ? [edit]
The Oxford Companion to Philosophy The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1995; second edition 2005) is a reference work in philosophy edited by Ted Honderich and published by Oxford University Press. The second edition included some 300 new entries. The new edition has over 2,200 entries and 291 contributors. Publication history[edit] Honderich, Ted (ed.). References[edit] Spurrett, David (Nov 1996). External links[edit] The OUP page for the Oxford Companion to Philosophy second edition Reductionism Descartes held that non-human animals could be reductively explained as automata — De homine, 1662. Reductionism strongly reflects a certain perspective on causality. In a reductionist framework, the phenomena that can be explained completely in terms of relations between other more fundamental phenomena, are called epiphenomena. Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be called emergent phenomena, but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. Religious reductionism generally attempts to explain religion by boiling it down to certain nonreligious causes. Types[edit] Richard H. Theoretical reductionism[edit] Theoretical reduction is the process by which one theory absorbs another. Methodological reductionism[edit] Methodological reductionism is the position that the best scientific strategy is to attempt to reduce explanations to the smallest possible entities. Ontological reductionism[edit]
Statement Statement or statements may refer to: Equality From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to navigationJump to search Equality may refer to: Law and Society[edit] Mathematics[edit] Logic[edit] Logical equality Places[edit] See also[edit] Symbol A red octagon symbolizes "stop" even without the word. A symbol is an object that represents, stands for, or suggests an idea, visual image, belief, action, or material entity. Symbols take the form of words, sounds, gestures, or visual images and are used to convey ideas and beliefs. For example, a red octagon may be a symbol for "STOP". On a map, a picture of a tent might represent a campsite. Numerals are symbols for numbers. Etymology[edit] The word derives from the Greek symbolon meaning token or watchword. Definitions[edit] In considering the effect of a symbol on the psyche, in his seminal essay The Symbol without Meaning Joseph Campbell proposes the following definition: A symbol is an energy evoking, and directing, agent.[2] Later, expanding on what he means by this definition Campbell says: "a symbol, like everything else, shows a double aspect. Heinrich Zimmer gives a concise overview of the nature, and perennial relevance, of symbols. Symbols and semiotics[edit] Paul Tillich[edit]
Formal language Sequence of words formed by specific rules The field of formal language theory studies primarily the purely syntactical aspects of such languages—that is, their internal structural patterns. Formal language theory sprang out of linguistics, as a way of understanding the syntactic regularities of natural languages. History[edit] In the 17th century, Gottfried Leibniz imagined and described the characteristica universalis, a universal and formal language which utilised pictographs. Gottlob Frege attempted to realize Leibniz's ideas, through a notational system first outlined in Begriffsschrift (1879) and more fully developed in his 2-volume Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903).[3] This described a "formal language of pure language In the first half of the 20th century, several developments were made with relevance to formal languages. In 1907, Leonardo Torres Quevedo introduced a formal language for the description of mechanical drawings (mechanical devices), in Vienna. Definition[edit]
Semantics of logic From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Study of the semantics, or interpretations, of formal and natural languages Overview[edit] The truth conditions of various sentences we may encounter in arguments will depend upon their meaning, and so logicians cannot completely avoid the need to provide some treatment of the meaning of these sentences. The semantics of logic refers to the approaches that logicians have introduced to understand and determine that part of meaning in which they are interested; the logician traditionally is not interested in the sentence as uttered but in the proposition, an idealised sentence suitable for logical manipulation. The main modern approaches to semantics for formal languages are the following: See also[edit] Philosophy portal References[edit]