background preloader

How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform

How Wall Street Killed Financial Reform

Défaut de la Grèce et CDS : Stiglitz accuse la BCE Joseph Stiglitz n'a pas sa langue en poche. Dans , le prix Nobel d'économie égratigne la Banque centrale européenne et son manque de transparence. Dans le dossier grec, Stiglitz estime que la position de l'institution de Francfort a été pour le moins curieuse. Que n'a-t-on écrit sur ces "credit default swaps", ces contrats qui permettent de s'assurer contre un défaut de paiement ? A la base, un CDS peut s'avérer utile. Mais revenons à Athènes. "Dans ce cas, un régulateur qui prend en compte la stabilité financière du système veille en principe à ce que l'assureur paye en cas de perte. Juges et parties ? Alors plusieurs hypothèses existent. Dans le milieu des économistes, certains s'interrogent aussi. Pour couronner le tout, c'est l'International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), composée de banquiers, qui décide si un "événement de crédit" a bien eu lieu et si ce dernier permet d'activer les CDS.

The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated by John Coffee Columbia Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); American Academy of Arts & SciencesJanuary 9, 2012 Cornell Law Review, 2012 Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 414 Abstract: Several commentators have argued that financial “reform” legislation enacted after a market crash is invariably flawed, results in “quack corporate governance” and “bubble laws,” and should be discouraged. This criticism has been specifically directed at both the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. As a result, a persistent cycle that this article calls the “Regulatory Sine Curve” can be observed: the legislative success of the latent investor group is followed by increasingly equivocal implementation of the new legislation, tepid enforcement, and eventual legislative erosion. This article does not deny that “reform” legislation often contains flaws (as does much deregulatory legislation). Number of Pages in PDF File: 85 Accepted Paper Series Suggested Citation

CDS et Grèce : Comment Wall Street manipule le plan de sauvetage de la Grèce - La station de métro Wall Street à New York. REUTERS/Eric Thayer - Il s’est passé une chose pour le moins curieuse lors de l’élaboration du plan de sauvetage de la Grèce. Les contrats d’échange sur défaut (CDS) –instruments financiers ayant contribué à déclencher le cataclysme de 2008– ont été mis de côté; une fois de plus, les grandes institutions financières n’ont pas eu à répondre de leur actes irresponsables. Tout au long de la progression des négociations sur la dépréciation de la dette grecque, une question décisive planait sur les marchés. publicité Rappelons que la vague de faillite qui a déferlé sur les Etats-Unis en 2008 (vague qui a nécessité une intervention massive de l’Etat) fut en grande partie imputable à AIG, qui s’était vu incapable de payer les CDS qu’il avait vendus. En Grèce, ces problèmes ont tout simplement été escamotés. Aussi volontaire qu'un aveu arraché à un prisonnier de Guantanamo Faisons le bilan de 2008 Revenons au présent. Eliot Spitzer Devenez fan sur

Paul Volcker Pushes for Reform, and Regrets His Past Silence He left behind a group of legislators in Washington still trying to nail down a controversial attempt to overhaul the nation’s in the wake of the country’s most serious economic crisis since . A well-regarded lion of the regulatory world, Mr. Volcker had endorsed the legislation before he went fishing, but unenthusiastically. If he were a teacher, and not a senior White House adviser and the towering former chairman of the , he says, he would have given the new rules just an ordinary B — not even a B-plus. “There is a certain circularity in all this business,” he concedes. As the financial overhaul took final shape recently, he worked the phone from his Manhattan office and made periodic visits to Washington, trying to persuade members of Congress to make the legislation more far-reaching. Like few other policy giants of his generation, Mr. Some analysts share Mr. Hear, hear, says Mr. “People are nervous about the long-term outlook, and they should be,” he says. AMONG the tools that Mr.

Anglo-Saxon media out to sink us, says Spain | World news It is the only economy in Western Europe still in recession: property prices are crashing, unemployment has risen to more than 4 million, and some are already muttering that it could end up with a financial crisis worse than Greece's. But at least Spain now has someone to blame: the country's intelligence services are investigating the role of British and American media in fomenting financial turmoil, the respected El País daily reported . The newspaper said the country's National Intelligence Centre (CNI) was investigating a series of "speculative attacks" against the Spanish economy amid bond market jitters about the country's growing national debt. "The (CNI's) economic intelligence division … is investigating whether investors' attacks and the aggressiveness of some Anglo-Saxon media are driven by market forces and challenges facing the Spanish economy – or whether there is something more behind this campaign," El País said.

Too Big to Fail Not Fixed, Despite Dodd-Frank: Simon Johnson Here we go again. Major shocks potentially threaten the solvency of some of the world’s largest financial institutions. Concerns grow over the ability of European leaders to shore up their banks, which are reeling from a sovereign-debt crisis. In the U.S., the shares of some large banks are trading at less than book value, while creditor confidence crumbles. Private conversations among economists, regulators and fund managers turn naturally to so-called resolution powers -- the expanded ability to take over and wind down private financial companies granted to federal regulators by the Dodd-Frank financial reform law. Instead, the government was forced to rely on the bankruptcy process, as in the case of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., or complete bailouts for all creditors, as in the case of American International Group. Imposing Losses First, the resolution authority under Dodd-Frank is purely domestic -- there is no cross-border dimension. Preemptive Use No Early Action Break Up Banks

Marchés déréglementés, le côté obscur de la finance Les « dark pools » sont dans le collimateur de la Commission européenne. Le projet de révision de la directive concernant les marchés d’instruments financiers (MIF) entend faire la lumière sur ces plateformes de négociation opaques, sorte de système alternatifs aux grandes bourses réglementées. C’est pourtant la transposition de la directive MIF qui a permis, en 2007, l’apparition de ces plateformes en Europe. Le terme « dark pool » recouvre en fait plusieurs types de systèmes informatisés d’échanges réservés aux investisseurs institutionnels opérant sans « transparence pré-négociation ». 2 à 5 % des échanges en Europe Deux types de dark pools se distinguent alors: les plateformes « prix de référence » et les « crossing networks ». Les transactions sur les dark pools concernent majoritairement de gros volumes d’actions. Dans la plupart des cas, les dark pools sont opérés soit par des banques, soit par les bourses traditionnelles. Manipulations de cours Brice Lambert à Paris

Taming the Too-Big-to-Fails: Will Dodd–Frank Be the Ticket or Is Lap-Band Surgery Required?, Nov. 15, 2011 - Richard Fisher Speeches - News & Events - FRB Dallas (With Reference to Vinny Guadagnino, Andrew Haldane, Paul Volcker, John Milton, Tom Hoenig and Churchill’s ‘Terminological Inexactitude’ ) Remarks before Columbia University’s Politics and Business Club It is bracing to be with bright, young students here at the Politics and Business Club of Columbia University. I understand I have a high bar today: I need to surmount the heights reached in the insightful lecture recently given your undergraduate students by Vinny Guadagnino from the show Jersey Shore. I’ll do my best. Executive Summary Today, I will speak to the issue of depository institutions considered “too big to fail” and “systemically important.” To this last point, my colleague and director of research at the Dallas Fed, Harvey Rosenblum, and I have written about how too-big-to-fail banks disrupt the transmission of policy initiatives. Paul ‘Moses’ and John Milton On previous occasions, I have referred to Paul Volcker as the Moses of central bankers.

L'expérience de l'austérité, grandeur nature Les 17 membres de l'Eurozone n'ont jamais imaginé devoir aider un des leurs. Encore moins trois. La Grèce, l'Irlande et le Portugal ont reçu plus de 140 milliards d'euros depuis un an et demi. Un pays membre de la zone euro en crise, cela semblait impossible pour l'Union européenne. Elle n'y était pas du tout préparée. Comment s'est propagée la crise? Après les Grecs, ce sont les Irlandais qui ont demandé de l'aide.