Jean Baudrillard Jean Baudrillard (/ˌboʊdriːˈɑr/;[1] French: [ʒɑ̃ bodʁijaʁ]; 27 July 1929 – 6 March 2007) was a French sociologist, philosopher, cultural theorist, political commentator, and photographer. His work is frequently associated with postmodernism and specifically post-structuralism. Life[edit] Baudrillard was born in Reims, northeastern France, on 27 July 1929. While teaching German, Baudrillard began to transfer to sociology, eventually completing his doctoral thesis Le Système des objets (The System of Objects) under the dissertation committee of Henri Lefebvre, Roland Barthes, and Pierre Bourdieu. In 1970, Baudrillard made the first of his many trips to the United States (Aspen, Colorado), and in 1973, the first of several trips to Kyoto, Japan. In 1986 he moved to IRIS (Institut de Recherche et d'Information Socio-Économique) at the Université de Paris-IX Dauphine, where he spent the latter part of his teaching career. Core ideas[edit] The object value system[edit] [edit] Reception[edit]
THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE Before we go any further here, has it ever occurred to any of you that all this is simply one grand misunderstanding? Since you're not here to learn anything, but to be taught so you can pass these tests, knowledge has to be organized so it can be taught, and it has to be reduced to information so it can be organized do you follow that? In other words this leads you to assume that organization is an inherent property of the knowledge itself, and that disorder and chaos are simply irrelevant forces that threaten it from outside. In fact it's exactly the opposite. Order is simply a thin, perilous condition we try to impose on the basic reality of chaos... --William Gaddis, JR, p. 25 According to C. There are at least three broad intellectual traditions of this subdiscipline. In developing precisely how knowledge becomes socially modified, sociologists have focused on such processes as: How does one know what knowledge is factual in this medium, what ideas are worthy of our attention?
George Herbert Mead George Herbert Mead George Herbert Mead (* 27. Februar 1863 in South Hadley, Massachusetts, USA; † 26. Biografie[Bearbeiten] Mead trat 1879 als Student in das von seinem Vater, Hiram Mead, geleitete Oberlin College ein. Nach seiner Graduierung im Jahr 1883 nahm Mead eine Stelle als Lehrer an, ihm wurde jedoch aufgrund disziplinarischer Schwierigkeiten mit den Schülern nach vier Monaten gekündigt. Ohne Promotion wurde Mead 1891 als Dozent für Psychologie, Philosophie und Evolutionstheorie an die University of Michigan berufen. Neben seiner Forschungs- und Lehrtätigkeit engagierte sich Mead in Chicago stark in sozialreformerischen Projekten. Chicagoer Schule – Wirkung auf den Symbolischen Interaktionismus[Bearbeiten] Meads Hauptwerk: „Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft“[Bearbeiten] Mead selbst hat seine Theorie nie systematisch niedergelegt. Die Entstehung der Identität[Bearbeiten] Laut Mead entsteht die Identität durch drei Medien: durch Sprache, Spiel (play) und Wettkampf (game).
Introduction to Social Influence, Persuasion, Compliance & Propaganda This portion of the Working Psychology website offers a brief introduction to a big topic: social influence, the modern, scientific study of persuasion, compliance, propaganda, "brainwashing," and the ethics that surround these issues. Although these topics aren't always simple (it is, after all, science), I've done my best to make this introduction interesting. Since Aristotle recorded his principles of persuasion in Rhetoric, humans have attempted to define and refine the principles of successful influence. Persuasion has been studied as an art for most of human history. The comparatively young science of social influence, however, can trace its roots to the second world war, when a social psychologist named Carl Hovland was contracted by the U.S. Armed Forces to bolster the morale of soldiers. Social scientists attempt to support any assertion with facts. Want a few examples of how social influence works in the real world before you continue? Copyright © 2002 by Kelton Rhoads, Ph.D.
George Herbert Mead George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) was an American philosopher, sociologist and psychologist, primarily affiliated with the University of Chicago, where he was one of several distinguished pragmatists. He is regarded as one of the founders of social psychology and the American sociological tradition in general. Biography[edit] Mead was born February 27, 1863 in South Hadley, Massachusetts. In autumn 1887, Mead enrolled at Harvard University, where his main interests were philosophy and psychology. In 1891 he married Helen Kingsbury Castle (1860–1929), the sister of Henry Northrup Castle (1862–1895), a friend he met at Oberlin.[2] Despite never finishing his dissertation, Mead was able to obtain a post at the University of Michigan in 1891. No detached philosopher, he was active in Chicago's social and political affairs; among his many activities include his work for the City Club of Chicago. Writings[edit] Pragmatism and symbolic interaction[edit] Social philosophy (behaviorism)[edit]
What You Can't Say January 2004 Have you ever seen an old photo of yourself and been embarrassed at the way you looked? Did we actually dress like that? We did. And we had no idea how silly we looked. What scares me is that there are moral fashions too. If you could travel back in a time machine, one thing would be true no matter where you went: you'd have to watch what you said. It seems to be a constant throughout history: In every period, people believed things that were just ridiculous, and believed them so strongly that you would have gotten in terrible trouble for saying otherwise. Is our time any different? It's tantalizing to think we believe things that people in the future will find ridiculous. The Conformist Test Let's start with a test: Do you have any opinions that you would be reluctant to express in front of a group of your peers? If the answer is no, you might want to stop and think about that. Like every other era in history, our moral map almost certainly contains a few mistakes. Trouble Why
Talcott Parsons Talcott Parsons (December 13, 1902 – May 8, 1979) was an American sociologist who served on the faculty of Harvard University from 1927 to 1973. Parsons analyzed the work of Émile Durkheim and Vilfredo Pareto and evaluated their contributions through the paradigm of voluntaristic action. Parsons was also largely responsible for introducing and interpreting Max Weber's work to American audiences. Biography[edit] Talcott Parsons was born 13 December 1902 in Colorado Springs. Studies: Amherst College[edit] As an undergraduate, Parsons studied biology, sociology and philosophy at Amherst College and received his B.A. in 1924. Parsons' biology teachers while at Amherst were Otto C. Two term papers Parsons wrote as a student for Clarence E. Studies: London School of Economics[edit] After Amherst, he studied at the London School of Economics for a year, where he was exposed to the work of R. Studies: University of Heidelberg[edit] Instructor at Harvard Department of Economics, 1927[edit]
Virtue Ethics 1. Preliminaries In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. 2. 3.
Homo sociologicus Der homo sociologicus (lat. = soziologischer Mensch) ist ein von Ralf Dahrendorf konzipiertes Akteursmodell der Soziologie, bei dem der Mensch als ein durch die Gesellschaft bedingtes Wesen gesehen wird, das sich Normen, Werten und Erwartungen beugen muss. Näheres[Bearbeiten] Der homo sociologicus bezeichnet einen Menschen, dem in seinem alltäglichen Leben verschiedene soziale Rollen zukommen, mit welchen wiederum verschiedene Normen, Werte und damit gesellschaftliche Erwartungen verbunden sind, denen er sich beugen muss. Muss-, Soll- und Kann-Erwartungen[1][Bearbeiten] Muss-Erwartung[Bearbeiten] Eine Muss-Erwartung ist eine Erwartung, die in jedem Fall zu erfüllen ist. Soll-Erwartung[Bearbeiten] Soll-Erwartungen üben einen kaum schwächeren Druck auf den homo sociologicus aus als Muss-Erwartungen, werden jedoch bei Verletzung nur mit sozialen Sanktionen geahndet. Kann-Erwartung[Bearbeiten] Kann-Erwartungen ziehen in der Regel keine negativen Folgen nach sich, wenn sie nicht erfüllt werden.
Homo economicus In economics, homo economicus, or economic human, is the concept in many economic theories of humans as rational and narrowly self-interested actors who have the ability to make judgments toward their subjectively defined ends. Using these rational assessments, homo economicus attempts to maximize utility as a consumer and economic profit as a producer.[1] This theory stands in contrast to the concept of homo reciprocans, which states that human beings are primarily motivated by the desire to be cooperative and to improve their environment. History of the term[edit] The term "economic man" was used for the first time in the late nineteenth century by critics of John Stuart Mill’s work on political economy.[2] Below is a passage from Mill’s work that those 19th-century critics were referring to: "[Political economy] does not treat the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man in society. Model[edit] Criticisms[edit] Responses[edit] See also[edit]
Psychoanalytic sociology Psychoanalytic sociology is the research field that analyzes society using the same methods that psychoanalysis applied to analyze an individual.[1] 'Psychoanalytic sociology embraces work from divergent sociological traditions and political perspectives': its common 'emphasis on unconscious mental processes and behavior renders psychoanalytic sociology a controversial subfield within the broader sociological discipline'[2] (as with psychoanalysis in academic psychology); and some[who?] sociologists consider the field to be insufficiently empirical and largely pseudoscientific.[citation needed] Similarly, sociatry applies psychiatry to society itself. History[edit] Freud (1907–1939)[edit] 'The desire to establish a link between psychoanalysis and sociology appears very early on in Freud's work. Freudians[edit] 'Many of the early analysts were Marxists ... 1960s and the Left[edit] Norman O. Feminist contributions[edit] Criticism[edit] See also[edit] References[edit] Further reading[edit]
Axel Honneth Axel Honneth (German: [aksl̩ ˈhɔnɛt]; born July 18, 1949) is a professor of philosophy at both the University of Frankfurt and Columbia University. He is also director of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) in Frankfurt am Main, Germany. Biography[edit] Honneth was born in Essen, West Germany on July 18, 1949, studied in Bonn, Bochum, Berlin and Munich (under Jürgen Habermas), and taught at the Free University of Berlin and the New School before moving to the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University of Frankfurt in 1996. In 2001, he became director of the Institute for Social Research, originally home to the so-called Frankfurt School, at the University of Frankfurt. Research[edit] Honneth's work focuses on social-political and moral philosophy, especially relations of power, recognition, and respect. Works translated into English[edit] Secondary Sources Notes[edit] See also[edit] External links[edit]