Conscience Gérard SabahGroupe Langage et CognitionLIMSI -- CNRS " La conscience est au psychologue ce que la gravité est au physicien : inévitable. " (Baars) Pendant de longues années, les chercheurs en intelligence artificielle et en sciences cognitives se sont gardés d'aborder le thème de la conscience, qui apparaissait comme une notion trop vague pour permettre une étude scientifique et pour fonder la cognition. Des Grecs à Descartes, les rapports entre le cerveau et l'esprit sont fondés sur le dualisme et l'interaction d'un corps et d'un esprit matériels. Descartes fut le premier à tenter d'expliciter comment un esprit non matériel interagissait avec le corps (par l'intermédiaire de la glande pinéale). Un renouveau de cette question semble dû à la théorie darwinienne de l'évolution bien qu'Eccles (Eccles 1992) se demande à ce sujet comment des organismes vivants ont acquis des expériences mentales -- non matérielles -- dans un monde autre que celui qui contenait alors tout ce qui existait ?
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LE CERVEAU À TOUS LES NIVEAUX! Parmi toutes les approches philosophiques proposées au fil des siècles pour tenter de résoudre , le dualisme et le matérialisme recueillent l’adhésion d’un nombre considérable de penseurs. Ceux-ci ont toutefois été amenés à nuancer ces deux positions théoriques générales afin de faire face aux critiques formulées à leur endroit. Pour éviter les pièges du dualisme de substance par exemple, on a proposé un « dualisme de propriété ». Celui-ci reconnaît que tout est matière mais que cette matière peut posséder deux types de propriété : des propriétés physiques et des propriétés mentales, ces dernières n’étant pas réductibles aux premières. La douleur aurait par exemple une propriété physique (les fibres C qui émettent des potentiels d’action) et, en même temps, une propriété consciente (le sentiment douloureux). Mais la question de savoir comment les états subjectifs peuvent influencer la matière sans violer les principes de la physique demeure irrésolue. Ou bien comme pour la température.
The Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness | Exploring the origins and future of consciousness Conscience Un article de Wikipédia, l'encyclopédie libre. « Pensées tourbillonnantes », une représentation photographique sur la question de la conscience : comment la conscience peut-elle être expliquée en termes de processus cérébraux ? Où se trouve le siège de la conscience ? La conscience est un phénomène difficile à définir précisément en raison de la difficulté à comprendre sa nature et ses contours, d’autant qu’il est loin d’être certain que ce qui cherche à la comprendre, la conscience elle-même précisément dont la raison est un outil stylisé, soit capable de se saisir elle-même (« le couteau ne peut se couper lui-même » disent les bouddhistes). D'un point de vue éthique ou moral, elle est également la faculté de discerner bien et mal. Polysémie[modifier | modifier le code] Le terme de conscience peut être distingué en plusieurs catégories : Représentations[modifier | modifier le code] La conscience de soi est bien illustrée en médecine, surtout au niveau individuel.
Consciousness Representation of consciousness from the seventeenth century At one time consciousness was viewed with skepticism by many scientists, but in recent years it has become a significant topic of research in psychology, neuropsychology and neuroscience. The primary focus is on understanding what it means biologically and psychologically for information to be present in consciousness—that is, on determining the neural and psychological correlates of consciousness. The majority of experimental studies assess consciousness by asking human subjects for a verbal report of their experiences (e.g., "tell me if you notice anything when I do this"). Issues of interest include phenomena such as subliminal perception, blindsight, denial of impairment, and altered states of consciousness produced by drugs and alcohol, or spiritual or meditative techniques. Etymology and early history[edit] John Locke, British philosopher active in the 17th century In the dictionary[edit] Philosophy of mind[edit]
Quantum mind–body problem The von Neumann–Wigner interpretation, also described as "consciousness causes collapse [of the wave function]", is an interpretation of quantum mechanics in which consciousness is postulated to be necessary for the completion of the process of quantum measurement. Background: Observation in quantum mechanics[edit] In the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation, quantum mechanics predicts only the probabilities for different outcomes of pre-specified observations. What constitutes an "observer" or an "observation" is not directly specified by the theory, and the behavior of a system upon observation is completely different than its usual behavior: The wavefunction that describes a system spreads out into an ever larger superposition of different possible situations. However, during observation, the wavefunction describing the system collapses to one of several options. If there is no observation, this collapse does not occur, and none of the options ever become less likely. Reception[edit]
The Nature of Consciousness: How the Internet Could Learn to Feel - Steve Paulson "Romantic reductionist" neuroscientist Christof Koch discusses the scientific side of consciousness, including the notion that all matter is, to varying degrees, sentient. If you had to list the hardest problems in science -- the questions even some scientists say are insoluble -- you would probably end up with two: Where do the laws of physics come from? How does the physical stuff in our brains produce conscious experience? Even though philosophers have obsessed over the "mind-body problem" for centuries, the mystery of consciousness wasn't considered a proper scientific question until two or three decades ago. By the 1980s, Crick had jumped from molecular biology to neuroscience and moved from England to California. Koch remains on the front lines of neurobiology. Why have you devoted so much of your life searching for the neural roots of consciousness? Koch: Consciousness is the central factor of our lives. What makes consciousness such a difficult problem for scientists to explain?
Web resources on consciousness, philosophy, and such Web resources related to consciousness, philosophy, and such. Compiled by David Chalmers Here are a small number of high-quality academic resources on the web that I find useful or interesting. The emphasis is on sites containing real intellectual content. See also my lists of people with online papers in philosophy and of online papers on consciousness. Consciousness resources Philosophy resources Philosophy journals online Cognitive science resources Meta-resources Disorders of consciousness Interactive demonstrations Miscellaneous sites with interesting content Go to: David Chalmers' home page
Table of contents (With last update date) Cover Foreword (August 13, 2009) Part 1. Preface to part 1 (April 12, 2000) Chapter 1. 1.1. 1.6. 1.7. Chapter 2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 2.6. Chapter 3. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. Chapter 4. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. Chapter 5. 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 5.5. 5.6. 5.7. 5.8. 5.9. 5.10. 5.11. 5.12. 5.13. 5.14. 5.15. 5.16. Chapter 6. 6.1. 6.2. 6.3. 6.4. 6.5. 6.6. 6.7. 6.8. 6.9. 6.10. 6.12. Part 2. Preface to part 2 (October 17, 2010) Chapter 7. 7.1. 7.2. 7.3. 7.4. 7.5. 7.6. 7.7. 7.9. 7.10. Chapter 8. 8.1. 8.2. Chapter 9. 9.1. 9.2. 9.3. 9.4. 9.6. Chapter 10. 10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4. Chapter 11. 11.1. 11.2. 11.3. 11.4. 11.5. 11.6. 11.7.The victim/victimizer polar pair 11.8. 11.9. 11.10. Chapter 12. 12.1. 12.2. 12.3. 12.5. 12.6. 12.7. Chapter 13. 13.1. 13.2. 13.3. 13.4. 13.5. 13.6. 13.7. 13.8. 13.9. 13.10. 13.11. 13.12. 13.13. Chapter 14. 14.1. 14.2. 14.3. 14.4. 14.5. 14.6. 14.7. 14.8. Chapter 15. Chapter 16. 16.3. 16.4. 16.5. Part 3. Preface to part 3 (November 18, 2009) Chapter 17. 17.1.
Qualia In philosophy, qualia (/ˈkwɑːliə/ or /ˈkweɪliə/; singular form: quale) are what some consider to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term "qualia" derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis (Latin pronunciation: [ˈkʷaːlɪs]) meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind"). Examples of qualia include the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, or the perceived redness of an evening sky. As qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes".[1] Daniel Dennett (b. 1942), American philosopher and cognitive scientist, regards qualia as "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".[2] Erwin Schrödinger (1887–1961), the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: The sensation of color cannot be accounted for by the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Definitions[edit] Arguments for the existence of qualia[edit] E. J.
Philosophy of mind A phrenological mapping[1] of the brain – phrenology was among the first attempts to correlate mental functions with specific parts of the brain Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind, mental events, mental functions, mental properties, consciousness, and their relationship to the physical body, particularly the brain. The mind–body problem, i.e. the relationship of the mind to the body, is commonly seen as one key issue in philosophy of mind, although there are other issues concerning the nature of the mind that do not involve its relation to the physical body, such as how consciousness is possible and the nature of particular mental states.[2][3][4] Mind–body problem[edit] Our perceptual experiences depend on stimuli that arrive at our various sensory organs from the external world, and these stimuli cause changes in our mental states, ultimately causing us to feel a sensation, which may be pleasant or unpleasant. Arguments for dualism[edit]