PROTECT IP Act. The PROTECT IP Act is a re-write of the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA),[5] which failed to pass in 2010. A similar House version of the bill, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), was introduced on October 26, 2011.[6] In the wake of online protests held on January 18, 2012, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced that a vote on the bill would be postponed until issues raised about the bill were resolved.[7][8][9] Content[edit] The bill defines infringement as distribution of illegal copies, counterfeit goods, or anti-digital rights management technology. The PROTECT IP Act says that an "information location tool shall take technically feasible and reasonable measures, as expeditiously as possible, to remove or disable access to the Internet site associated with the domain name set forth in the order".
Supporters[edit] Legislators[edit] Companies and trade organizations[edit] The U.S. Others[edit] Opponents[edit] Legislators[edit] Companies and organizations[edit] Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is a United States copyright law that implements two 1996 treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). It criminalizes production and dissemination of technology, devices, or services intended to circumvent measures (commonly known as digital rights management or DRM) that control access to copyrighted works. It also criminalizes the act of circumventing an access control, whether or not there is actual infringement of copyright itself.
In addition, the DMCA heightens the penalties for copyright infringement on the Internet.[1][2] Passed on October 12, 1998, by a unanimous vote in the United States Senate and signed into law by President Bill Clinton on October 28, 1998, the DMCA amended Title 17 of the United States Code to extend the reach of copyright, while limiting the liability of the providers of online services for copyright infringement by their users. Provisions[edit] Title IV: Miscellaneous Provisions[edit] Stop Online Piracy Act. Failed United States bill Proponents of the legislation said it would protect the intellectual-property market and corresponding industry, jobs and revenue, and was necessary to bolster enforcement of copyright laws, especially against foreign-owned and operated websites.
Claiming flaws in existing laws that do not cover foreign-owned and operated websites, and citing examples of active promotion of rogue websites by U.S. search engines, proponents asserted that stronger enforcement tools were needed. The bill received strong, bipartisan support in the House of Representatives and the Senate.
It also received support from the Fraternal Order of Police, the National Governors Association, The National Conference of Legislatures, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Attorneys General, the Chamber of Commerce, the Better Business Bureau, the AFL–CIO and 22 trade unions, and the National Consumers League.[2] History[edit] Goals[edit] According to Rep. Sponsor Rep. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that issue ads may not be banned from the months preceding a primary or general election.
Background[edit] In 2002, the Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("McCain-Feingold" or "BCRA"), amending the Federal Election Campaign Act to further regulate money in public election campaigns. One primary purpose of the legislation was to regulate what were colloquially known as "issue ads. " "Issue ads" typically discussed a candidate name with regards to a particular issue, but because they did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, they fell outside the prohibitions and limitations of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Wisconsin Right to Life Inc. In the first round of litigation, the federal district court ruled that the language of McConnell v. Opinion of the Supreme Court[edit] Proposed text of WRTL ad[edit] McConnell v. Federal Election Commission. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003),[1] is a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of most of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), often referred to as the McCain–Feingold Act. It was partially overruled by Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).[2] History[edit] In May 2003, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a ruling on the constitutionality of the law, but the ruling never took effect because the case was immediately appealed to the U.S.
Oral arguments[edit] The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in a special session on September 8, 2003. Opinions[edit] Justices Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg established the majority for two parts of the Court's opinion: With respect to Titles I and II of the BCRA, Justices Stevens, O'Connor wrote the opinion of the Court.With respect to Title V of the BCRA, Justice Breyer wrote the Court's opinion. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited corporations from using treasury money to make independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections, did not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court upheld the restriction on corporate speech "Corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections," and the Michigan law still allowed the corporation to make such expenditures from a segregated fund.
Background[edit] The Michigan Campaign Finance Act banned corporations from spending treasury money on "independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. " The Act had one loophole-if a corporation had an independent fund solely used for political purposes the law did not apply. Decision of the Supreme Court[edit] Louis J. The decision was overruled by Citizens United v. See also[edit] References[edit] Corporate personhood. Corporate personhood is the legal notion that a corporation, separately from its associated human beings (like owners, managers, or employees), has some, but not all, of the legal rights and responsibilities enjoyed by natural persons (physical humans).[1] For example, corporations have the right to enter into contracts with other parties and to sue or be sued in court in the same way as natural persons or unincorporated associations of persons.
Corporate personhood in the United States[edit] As a matter of interpretation of the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. courts have extended certain constitutional protections to corporations. Some opponents of corporate personhood seek to amend the U.S. Constitution to limit these rights to those provided by state law and state constitutions.[2][3] The basis for allowing corporations to assert protection under the U.S. Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. Historical background in the United States[edit] Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)[dead link], is a U.S. constitutional law case dealing with the regulation of campaign spending by organizations. The United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the government from restricting independent political expenditures by a nonprofit corporation.
The principles articulated by the Supreme Court in the case have also been extended to for-profit corporations, labor unions and other associations. Background[edit] The complainant alleged that the release and distribution of FAHRENHEIT 9/11 constituted an independent expenditure because the film expressly advocated the defeat of President Bush and that by being fully or partially responsible for the film's release, Michael Moore and other entities associated with the film made excessive and/or prohibited contributions to unidentified candidates. Before the Supreme Court[edit] Opinions of the Court[edit] Overview[edit] Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad. Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) was a matter brought before the United States Supreme Court – but not decided by the court – which dealt with taxation of railroad properties. A report issued by the Court Reporter claimed to state the sense of the Court – without a decision or written opinions published by or of the Court. This was the first time that the Supreme Court was reported to hold that the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause granted constitutional protections to corporations as well as to natural persons, although numerous other cases, since Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819, have recognized that corporations were entitled to some of the protections of the Constitution. In the opinion, the Court consolidated three separate cases: History and legal dispute[edit] Headnote[edit] Bancroft Davis, the Court Reporter and former president of Newburgh and New York Railway Waite replied: C.
Why did the chief justice issue his dictum?