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Cognitive distortion. Moreover, cognitive distortions are thoughts that cause individuals to perceive reality negatively.

Cognitive distortion

These negative thinking patterns are simply convincing the mind of individuals that what they see is true when it is not. They are inaccurate thoughts that usually reinforce negative thoughts or emotions. [2] Cognitive distortions tend to interfere with the way a person perceives an event. Since the way a person feels intervenes with how they think, these distorted thoughts feed their negative emotions. As a result, an individual affected by cognitive distortions may have an overall negative outlook on the world. History[edit] In 1980, Burns published his book, Feeling Good: The New Mood Therapy,[4] (with a preface from Beck) and nine years later published The Feeling Good Handbook in 1989.

Main types[edit] The cognitive distortions listed below[1] are categories of automatic thinking, and are to be distinguished from logical fallacies.[5] Tinkerbell effect. The Tinkerbell effect is an American English expression describing things that are thought to exist only because people believe in them.

Tinkerbell effect

The effect is named for Tinker Bell, the fairy in the play Peter Pan who is revived from near death by the belief of the audience. See also[edit] References[edit] External links[edit] Vsauce, How Much Money is there on Earth? Wisdom of repugnance. Origin and usage[edit] The term "wisdom of repugnance" was coined in 1997 by Leon Kass, chairman (2001–2005) of the President's Council on Bioethics, in an article in The New Republic,[3] which was later expanded into a further (2001) article in the same magazine,[4] and also incorporated into his 2002 book Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity.[5] Kass stated that disgust was not an argument per se, but went on to say that "in crucial cases...repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it.

Wisdom of repugnance

" The term remains largely confined to discussions of bioethics, and is somewhat related to the term "yuck factor". However, unlike the latter, it is used almost exclusively by those who accept its underlying premise; i.e., that repugnance does, in fact, indicate wisdom. It is thus often viewed as loaded language, and is primarily used by certain bioconservatives to justify their position.

Fallacy. A fallacy is an argument that uses poor reasoning.


An argument can be fallacious whether or not its conclusion is true.[1][2] A fallacy can be either formal or informal. An error that stems from a poor logical form is sometimes called a formal fallacy or simply an invalid argument. An informal fallacy is an error in reasoning that does not originate in improper logical form.[3] Arguments committing informal fallacies may be formally valid, but still fallacious.[4] Fallacies of presumption fail to prove the conclusion by assuming the conclusion in the proof. Fallacies of weak inference fail to prove the conclusion due to insufficient evidence. Some fallacies are committed intentionally (to manipulate or persuade by deception), others unintentionally due to carelessness or ignorance.

Formal fallacy[edit] A formal fallacy is a pattern of reasoning that is always wrong. Common examples[edit] Aristotle's Fallacies[edit] Aristotle was the first to systematize logical errors into a list. Naturalistic fallacy. In philosophical ethics, the term "naturalistic fallacy" was introduced by British philosopher G.

Naturalistic fallacy

E. Moore in his 1903 book Principia Ethica.[1] Moore argues it would be fallacious to explain that which is good reductively in terms of natural properties such as "pleasant" or "desirable". The naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the fallacious appeal to nature, the claim that what is natural is inherently good or right, and that what is unnatural is inherently bad or wrong. Furthermore, Moore's naturalistic fallacy is closely related to the is–ought problem, which comes from Hume's Treatise. However, unlike Hume's view of the is–ought problem, Moore (and other proponents of ethical non-naturalism) did not consider the naturalistic fallacy to be at odds with moral realism.