For ASSC. J.
Kevin O'Regan Laboratoire de Psychologie Expérimentale, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Talk given at Bressanone on 24 Jan 2001 Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology. A way round the problem is to postulate that experience is not something we feel, but something we do: a kind of give-and-take with the environment, analogous to the "feel" of driving a car. One consequence of such a "sensorimotor" theory of experience is that it provides a way of explaining the differences between seeing, hearing, touch, etc., which is more principled and has more explanatory power than Müller's notion of "specific nerve energy" or its modern counterpart, the notion of sensory pathways or cortical areas.
Processing 1.0 (BETA) Tracking the Way We Use Language /