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The Metamodernist Manifesto. Whats Done is Done: Descartes on Resoluteness and Regret. Against narrativity. Razor (philosophy) In philosophy, a razor is a principle or rule of thumb that allows one to eliminate ("shave off") unlikely explanations for a phenomenon.[1] Razors include:

Razor (philosophy)

Hanlon's razor. As an eponymous law, it may have been named after Robert J.

Hanlon's razor

Hanlon. There are also earlier sayings that convey the same idea dating back at least as far as Goethe in 1774. Origins and etymology[edit] Inspired by Occam's razor,[1] the aphorism was popularized in this form and under this name by the Jargon File, a glossary of computer programmer slang.[2][3] In 1990, it appeared in the Jargon File described as a "'murphyism' parallel to Occam's Razor".[4] Later that same year, the Jargon File editors noted lack of knowledge about the term's derivation and the existence of a similar epigram by William James.[5] In 1996, the Jargon File entry on Hanlon's Razor noted the existence of a similar quotation in Robert A. In 2001, Quentin Stafford-Fraser published two blog entries citing e-mails from one Joseph E. Similar quotations[edit] Another similar quotation appears in Goethe's The Sorrows of Young Werther (1774): Similarly, Jane West's The Loyalists (1812) includes: See also[edit]

Mimesis. In ancient Greece, mimesis was an idea that governed the creation of works of art, in particular, with correspondence to the physical world understood as a model for beauty, truth, and the good.

Mimesis

Plato contrasted mimesis, or imitation, with diegesis, or narrative. After Plato, the meaning of mimesis eventually shifted toward a specifically literary function in ancient Greek society, and its use has changed and been reinterpreted many times since then. The Frankfurt school critical theorist T. W. Character mask. A character mask (German: Charaktermaske) in the Marxian sense is a character disguised with a different character.

Character mask

The term was used by Karl Marx in various published writings from the 1840s to the 1860s, and also by Friedrich Engels. It is related to the classical Greek concepts of mimesis (imitative representation using analogies) and prosopopoeia (impersonation or personification) as well as the Roman concept of persona,[1] but also differs from them (see below).[2] The notion of character masks has been used by neo-Marxist and non-Marxist sociologists,[3] philosophers[4] and anthropologists[5] to interpret how people relate in societies with a complex division of labour, where people depend on trade to meet many of their needs. Marx's own idea of character masks was not a cut-and-dried academic concept with a fixed definition. Character masks versus social masks[edit] A sophisticated academic language for talking about the sociology of roles did not exist in the mid-19th century. C. Swampman.

This article is about a philosophical thought-experiment.

Swampman

For the comic book character, see Swamp Thing. Suppose Davidson goes hiking in the swamp and is struck and killed by a lightning bolt. At the same time, nearby in the swamp another lightning bolt spontaneously rearranges a bunch of molecules such that, entirely by coincidence, they take on exactly the same form that Davidson's body had at the moment of his untimely death.This being, whom Davidson terms "Swampman," has, of course, a brain which is structurally identical to that which Davidson had, and will thus, presumably, behave exactly as Davidson would have. He will walk out of the swamp, return to Davidson's office at Berkeley, and write the same essays he would have written; he will interact like an amicable person with all of Davidson's friends and family, and so forth.

Davidson holds that there would nevertheless be a difference, though no one would notice it. The Swampman has no causal history. Brain in a vat. A brain in a vat that believes it is walking Uses[edit] The simplest use of brain-in-a-vat scenarios is as an argument for philosophical skepticism[2] and solipsism.

Brain in a vat

A simple version of this runs as follows: Since the brain in a vat gives and receives exactly the same impulses as it would if it were in a skull, and since these are its only way of interacting with its environment, then it is not possible to tell, from the perspective of that brain, whether it is in a skull or a vat. Yet in the first case most of the person's beliefs may be true (if they believe, say, that they are walking down the street, or eating ice-cream); in the latter case their beliefs are false. Since the argument says one cannot know whether one is a brain in a vat, then one cannot know whether most of one's beliefs might be completely false. However, if one accepts a utilitarian or some logical positivist ethical philosophy, then one should behave as though the external world is real.

Alan Watts ~ Society Is A Hoax , Take Control Of Your Life. What is Wrong With Our Culture [Alan Watts]