The Metamodernist Manifesto. Whats Done is Done: Descartes on Resoluteness and Regret. Against narrativity. Razor (philosophy) In philosophy, a razor is a principle or rule of thumb that allows one to eliminate ("shave off") unlikely explanations for a phenomenon.[1] Razors include: Hanlon's razor. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Adage to assume stupidity over malice The Court of Foolishness of Gerard de Lairesse. The accused, pursued by Hatred, is led by Calumny, Envy and Perfidy before a judge with donkey ears, surrounded by Ignorance and Suspicion. Hanlon's razor is an adage or rule of thumb that states, "Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity. "[1] Known in several other forms, it is a philosophical razor that suggests a way of eliminating unlikely explanations for human behavior. It is probably named after Robert J. Origin[edit] A similar quotation appears in Robert A.
The quotation as such was a submission credited in print to Robert J. The name was inspired by Occam's razor.[11] Other variations of the idea[edit] There is very little deliberate wickedness in the world. See also[edit] References[edit] Mimesis. Communication by means of imitation The original Ancient Greek term mīmēsis (μίμησις) derives from mīmeisthai (μιμεῖσθαι, 'to imitate'), itself coming from mimos (μῖμος, 'imitator, actor'). In ancient Greece, mīmēsis was an idea that governed the creation of works of art, in particular, with correspondence to the physical world understood as a model for beauty, truth, and the good. Plato contrasted mimesis, or imitation, with diegesis, or narrative.
After Plato, the meaning of mimesis eventually shifted toward a specifically literary function in ancient Greek society.[3] In addition to Plato and Auerbach, mimesis has been theorised by thinkers as diverse as Aristotle,[5] Philip Sidney, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Adam Smith, Gabriel Tarde, Sigmund Freud, Walter Benjamin,[6] Theodor Adorno,[7] Paul Ricœur, Luce Irigaray, Jacques Derrida, René Girard, Nikolas Kompridis, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Michael Taussig,[8] Merlin Donald, Homi Bhabha, Roberto Calasso, and Nidesh Lawtoo. Plato[edit] Character mask. Prescribed social role that conceals the contradictions of a social relation or order In Marxist philosophy, a character mask (German: Charaktermaske) is a prescribed social role which conceals the contradictions of a social relation or order. The term was used by Karl Marx in published writings from the 1840s to the 1860s, and also by Friedrich Engels.
It is related to the classical Greek concepts of mimesis (imitative representation using analogies) and prosopopoeia (impersonation or personification), and the Roman concept of persona,[1] but also differs from them.[2] Neo-Marxist and non-Marxist sociologists,[3] philosophers[4] and anthropologists[5] have used character masks to interpret how people relate in societies with a complex division of labour, where people depend on trade to meet many of their needs.
Marx's own notion of the character mask was not a fixed idea with a singular definition. Versus social masks[edit] The closest equivalent term in modern English is social masks. Swampman. This article is about a philosophical thought-experiment. For the comic book character, see Swamp Thing. Suppose Davidson goes hiking in the swamp and is struck and killed by a lightning bolt. At the same time, nearby in the swamp another lightning bolt spontaneously rearranges a bunch of molecules such that, entirely by coincidence, they take on exactly the same form that Davidson's body had at the moment of his untimely death.This being, whom Davidson terms "Swampman," has, of course, a brain which is structurally identical to that which Davidson had, and will thus, presumably, behave exactly as Davidson would have. He will walk out of the swamp, return to Davidson's office at Berkeley, and write the same essays he would have written; he will interact like an amicable person with all of Davidson's friends and family, and so forth.
Davidson holds that there would nevertheless be a difference, though no one would notice it. The Swampman has no causal history. Objections[edit] Brain in a vat. A brain in a vat that believes it is walking Uses[edit] The simplest use of brain-in-a-vat scenarios is as an argument for philosophical skepticism[2] and solipsism. A simple version of this runs as follows: Since the brain in a vat gives and receives exactly the same impulses as it would if it were in a skull, and since these are its only way of interacting with its environment, then it is not possible to tell, from the perspective of that brain, whether it is in a skull or a vat. Yet in the first case most of the person's beliefs may be true (if they believe, say, that they are walking down the street, or eating ice-cream); in the latter case their beliefs are false.
Since the argument says one cannot know whether one is a brain in a vat, then one cannot know whether most of one's beliefs might be completely false. However, if one accepts a utilitarian or some logical positivist ethical philosophy, then one should behave as though the external world is real. In fiction[edit] Philosophy. Alan Watts ~ Society Is A Hoax , Take Control Of Your Life.
What is Wrong With Our Culture [Alan Watts]