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Previous finals 175. Kant's Transcendental Arguments (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) 1.

The Icon The icon appearing on your browser is a partial drawing of a triangle. Kant used the example of the construction of a triangle in several places in the Critique of Pure Reason. Perhaps this passage from the Preface to the second edition most easily shows its importance. When the isosceles triangle was first demonstrated, something dawned on the man who did so. (He may have been called Thales, or by some other name.) He found that what he needed to do was not to investigate what he saw in the figure, nor—for that matter—to investigate the mere concept of that figure, and to let that inform him, as it were, of the figure’s properties. He found, rather, that he must bring out (by constructing the figure) the properties that the figure had by virtue of what he himself was, according to concepts, thinking into it a priori and exhibiting. And he found that in order for him to know anything a priori and with certainty about the figure, he must attribute to this thing nothing but what follows necessarily from what he has himself put into it in accordance with his concept. (Bxi-xii, Pluhar translation) The notion that a priori knowledge is the result of what we “put into” the objects of our knowledge is the basis of Kant’s attempted rehabilitation of metaphysics. – seanmhines
The table of judgments[edit] Kant believed that the ability of the human understanding (Verstand) to think about and know an object is the same as the making of a spoken or written judgment about an object. According to him, "Our ability to judge is equivalent to our ability to think."[8] A judgment is the thought that a thing is known to have a certain quality or attribute. For example, the sentence "The rose is red" is a judgment. Kant created a table of the forms of such judgments as they relate to all objects in general.[9] Table of Judgements Category Judgements Quantity Universal Particular Singular Quality Affirmative Negative Infinite Relation Categorical Hypothetical Disjunctive Modality Problematical Assertoric Apodictic This table of judgments was used by Kant as a model for the table of categories. Taken together, these twelvefold tables constitute the formal structure for Kant's architectonic conception of his philosophical system.[10] The table of categories[edit] Table of Categories Category Categories Quantity Totality Plurality Unity Quality Reality Negation Limitation Relation Inherence and Subsistence (substance and accident) Causality and Dependence (cause and effect) Community (reciprocity) Modality Possibility Actuality Necessity Schemata[edit] – seanmhines

The Transcendental Deduction The Transcendental Deduction (A84–130, B116–169) is Kant's attempt to demonstrate against empiricist psychological theory that certain a priori concepts correctly apply to objects featured in our experience.

Kant's Transcendental Arguments (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Does Consciousness Exist? (1904). By William James in ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM (1904) // Fair Use Repository. Thoughts and things are names for two sorts of object, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other.

Kant wrote that "To demonstrate the reality of our concepts, intuitions are required."[4] Since empirical concepts are derived from perceptions, examples of the intuitive perceptions can be used to verify the concept. Kant asserted that pure concepts, or categories of the understanding, can also be verified by inspecting their intuitions or schemata. "If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called examples: if they are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions are called schemata."[4] Schopenhauer described the use of examples in the following way: Thus, since he aimed at finding for every empirical function of the faculty of knowledge an analogous a priori function, he remarked that, between our empirical perceiving and our empirical thinking, carried out in abstract non–perceptible concepts, a connection very frequently, though not always, takes place, since every now and then we attempt to go back from abstract thinking to perceiving. We attempt this, however, merely to convince ourselves that our abstract thinking has not strayed far from the safe ground of perception, and has possibly become somewhat high–flown or even a mere idle display of words, much in the same way as, when walking in the dark, we stretch out our hand every now and then to the wall that guides us. We then go back to perception only tentatively and for a moment, by calling up in imagination a perception corresponding to the concept that occupies us at the moment, a perception which yet can never be quite adequate to the concept, but is a mere representative of it for the time being. — [2] – seanmhines
Kant’s warning about transgressing the bounds of possible experience want's to dispel Neo-Kantianism – seanmhines
Thoughts and things are names for two sorts of object, which common sense will always find contrasted and will always practically oppose to each other. Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has varied in the past in her expectations of it, and may be expected to vary in the future. At first, spirit and matter, soul and body, stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance. The transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing. In the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Rehmke, Natorp, Münsterberg — at any rate in his earlier writings, Schubert-Soldern and others, the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the content of experience is known. It loses personal form and activity — these passing over to the content — and becomes a bare Bewussheit or Bewusstsein überhaupt, of which in its own right absolutely nothing can be said. (Essay I ¶ 1) I believe that consciousness, when once it has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether. It is the name of a nonentity, and has no right to a place among first principles. Those who still cling to it are clinging to a mere echo, the faint rumor left behind by the disappearing soul upon the air of philosophy. During the past year, I have read a number of articles whose authors seemed just on the point of abandoning the notion of consciousness, and substituting for it that of an absolute experience not due to two factors. But they were not quite radical enough, not daring enough in their negations. For twenty years past I have mistrusted consciousness as an entity: for seven or eight years past I have suggested its non-existence to my students, and tried to give them its pragmatic equivalent in realities of experience. It seems to me that the hour is ripe for it to be openly and universally discarded. – seanmhines

Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, has varied in the past in her expectations of it, and may be expected to vary in the future.

Does Consciousness Exist? (1904). By William James in ESSAYS IN RADICAL EMPIRICISM (1904) // Fair Use Repository

At first, spirit and matter, soul and body, stood for a pair of equipollent substances quite on a par in weight and interest. But one day Kant undermined the soul and brought in the transcendental ego, and ever since then the bipolar relation has been very much off its balance. The transcendental ego seems nowadays in rationalist quarters to stand for everything, in empiricist quarters for almost nothing.

In the hands of such writers as Schuppe, Rehmke, Natorp, Münsterberg — at any rate in his earlier writings, Schubert-Soldern and others, the spiritual principle attenuates itself to a thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a name for the fact that the content of experience is known. William James His Life and Philosophy. The principles of psychology.

Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) ‘thoughts and feelings’ (2) a ‘physical world’ in time and space with which they co-exist, and which (3) they ‘know’ [apperception?]. The discussion of these data (as of other elements) is called metaphysics… Assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, when psychology is able to correlate empirically thoughts and feelings with certain “definite conditions of the brain” can go no further as a natural science. • All attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities (i.e., Soul, Transcendental Ego, Ideas, or Elementary Units of Consciousness) are metaphysical. o From this perspective James “dismisses” associationist and spiritualist theories Blah blah, take the short route first: Chapter IV: Habit: Living creatures are a bundle of habits In wild animals the usual round of daily behavior seems innate In domestic animals (and humans) daily behavior is learned Innate habits are called ‘instincts’ Learned habits are called ‘acts of reason’ The laws of Nature are nothing but the immutable habits which the different elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other. In the Organic World, however, the habits are more variable than this Even instincts vary from one individual to another [personality?], and Are modified in the same individual to suit the exigencies of the case. The habits of an elementary particle cannot change (on the principles of atomistic philosophy), because the particle itself is an unchangeable thing; but those Of a compound mass of matter (an unchangeable thing) can change [emergent], because They are in the last instance due to the structure of the compound, and either outward forces or inward tensions can, from one hour to another, turn that structure into something different from what it was. If the body is plastic enough to maintain its integrity as its structure yields/morphs. +The change of structure need not be of outward shape; It may be invisible and molecular, as when a bar of iron becomes magnetic Or crystalline through the action of certain outward causes e.g, India-rubber becomes friable (vulcanization), or plaster ‘sets’ --all the changes are relatively slow --the material resists the modifying cause --which takes time to overcome --but the gradual yielding, saves the material from ‘disintegration’ --after yielding, the inertia of the transformation becomes a condition of its comparative permanence in the new form, and of the new habits its body manifests – seanmhines