Numerical fiscal rules in the EU Member States - ECFIN. The 2005 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: an assessment. Speech by José Manuel González-Páramo, Member of the Executive Board of the ECBConference on “New Perspectives on Fiscal Sustainability”Frankfurt, 13 October 2005 Dear colleagues, I am delighted at the opportunity to address this very distinguished audience in the context of what I am sure it will be a very important and stimulating conference organised by the Centre for Financial Studies at Goethe University and the Centre for European Integration Studies at Bonn University.
Thank you very much for your kind invitation. It is frequently said that nothing pleases central bankers more than to talk about fiscal policy. May be there is some truth in this. 1. The main rationale for fiscal rules is to correct the so-called “deficit bias” of fiscal policy[1]. Such high deficits and growing debt levels are a cause for concern. High deficit and debt levels can also have implications for monetary policy. But since 1999 intra-euro area exchange rates have ceased to exist. 2. 3. 4.3. EU reforms to Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules. Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the second subparagraph of Article 126(14) thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments, Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parliament(1) , Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank(2) , Acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, Whereas: (1) The coordination of the economic policies of the Member States within the Union, as provided by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) , should entail compliance with the guiding principles of stable prices, sound public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments. (4b) Achieving and maintaining a dynamic Single Market should be considered an element of the proper and smooth functioning of the economic and monetary union.
Article 1 Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 is amended as follows: 1. The role of fiscal rules in determining fiscal performance: the Canadian case | ASIP Asociación Internacional de Presupuesto Público. Summary This paper examines the role of legislated fiscal rules in determining fiscal performance. It reviews the rationale for fiscal rules and discusses the advantages and drawbacks associated with them, notably the possibility that rules may impede countercyclical fiscal policy. The paper then analyzes the use of fiscal rules in the United States, the European Economic and Monetary Union, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden and Canada. Rules at the subnational level in the United States and Canada are also examined. A review of the experiences of several nations during the fiscal consolidation of the mid-1990s indicates that countries both with and without fiscal rules implemented successful fiscal adjustments.
A review of empirical studies addressing fiscal rules generally supports these conclusions. I. The topic of fiscal rules has attracted significant attention over the last decade, as several countries have adopted fiscal rules in an attempt to eliminate large deficits. Survey: Fiscal Rules Can Help Improve Fiscal Performance. Customer in Geneva, Switzerland, which introduced “debt brake” rule in 2003 to stabilize public debt level (photo: Martin Reutschi/Newscom) Fiscal Policy Manmohan S. Kumar, Emanuele Baldacci, and Andrea SchaechterIMF Fiscal Affairs Department December 22, 2009 Fiscal rules can help strengthen public finances Financial crisis has strained fiscal rules, with several countries modifying or suspending them Countries with large consolidation needs could design and announce rules now; implementation might need to wait The use of fiscal rules has been generally associated with improved fiscal performance and more successful fiscal consolidations, although the current financial crisis has strained fiscal rules, says a new study by the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department.
In recent years, an increasing number of countries—especially emerging market and low-income economies—have relied on fiscal rules to guide policy. Fiscal rules globally Fiscal rules have become more common in recent years. Anchoring Fiscal Expectations (2009 International Monetary Fund paper on rules) Working Paper 03/10, Martin Heipertz: The Stability and Growth Pact. MPIfG Working Paper 03/10, October 2003 The Stability and Growth Pact – Not the Best but Better than Nothing. Reviewing the Debate on Fiscal Policy in Europe's Monetary Union Martin Heipertz, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies Abstract This paper aims to review the economic literature on the Maastricht deficit rule and the Stability and Growth Pact. The author tries to expose the contradictions and inconclusiveness of the debate, highlighting both the criticism and the defense of the fiscal policy regime in EMU. Zusammenfassung Dieses Papier ist eine summarische Auswertung der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fachliteratur zur Defizitregel des Maastrichter Vertrages und dem Europäischen Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt.
Contents I try to condense more than a decade of economic literature on the deficit rule of the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and its strengthened version in the SGP. Grand Debates Discipline versus Flexibility Rules versus Discretion.