Cartesian Dualism. René Descartes's illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to the epiphysis in the brain and from there to the immaterial spirit. In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2] Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, and can be divided into three different types: Substance dualism asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of substances.[1]Property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in emergentism).[1]Predicate dualism claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates.[1]
Interactionalism. René Descartes's illustration of dualism. Inputs are passed on by the sensory organs to the epiphysis in the brain and from there to the immaterial spirit. In philosophy of mind, dualism is the position that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical,[1] or that the mind and body are not identical.[2] Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, and is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism, in the mind–body problem.[1][2] Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, and can be divided into three different types: Substance dualism asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of substances.[1]Property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter (as in emergentism).[1]Predicate dualism claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates.[1]
Interactionism (philosophy of mind) - Wikipedia, the free encycl. Examples: You are outside walking and a wild animal suddenly crosses your path. This affects your mind resulting in your face showing fear and you step back. The animal sees your fear, becomes fearful itself, and retreats back into the brush. You then feel relieved, as does the animal. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article Interactionism Encyclopedia Britannica.Interactionism Philosophy Index.Varieties of Dualism: Interaction Stanford University. Conservation of energy. In physics, the law of conservation of energy states that the total energy of an isolated system cannot change—it is said to be conserved over time. Energy can be neither created nor destroyed, but can change form, for instance chemical energy can be converted to kinetic energy in the explosion of a stick of dynamite. A consequence of the law of conservation of energy is that a perpetual motion machine of the first kind cannot exist.
That is to say, no system without an external energy supply can deliver an unlimited amount of energy to its surroundings.[2] History[edit] Gottfried Leibniz Ancient philosophers as far back as Thales of Miletus c.~550 BCE had inklings of the conservation of some underlying substance of which everything is made. However, there is no particular reason to identify this with what we know today as "mass-energy" (for example, Thales thought it was water). Was conserved so long as the masses did not interact. Was the conserved vis viva. Gaspard-Gustave Coriolis where. Sensory phenomenology, O'Reagan,K, 2001. J. Kevin O'Regan Laboratoire de Psychologie Expérimentale, Centre National de Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Talk given at Bressanone on 24 Jan 2001 Any theory of experience which postulates that brain mechanisms generate "raw feel" encounters the impassable "explanatory gap" separating physics from phenomenology.
A way round the problem is to postulate that experience is not something we feel, but something we do: a kind of give-and-take with the environment, analogous to the "feel" of driving a car. As applied to visual perception, a consequence of the sensorimotor approach is the idea that seeing does not consist in the creation of a "re-"presentation of the world inside the brain, but rather in knowledge that the outside world is immediately accessible through a flick of the eye or of attention, like an "outside memory". If I show you a picture and make a change in it, like this, you immediately see the change. there's no problem, it pops out. Change with no transient. J. Kevin O'Regan.