Seven Myths About a Nuclear Iran. Israelis hold placards as they protest against a possible attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, in Tel Aviv March 24, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Nir Elias) Author: Yedioth Ahronoth (Israel) Posted August 16, 2012 1. A nuclear Iran is an existential threat to Israel. One atom bomb will destroy us. The death radius of the kind of atom bomb that Iran is developing is between 500 and 1,000 meters (less than a mile). Summary⎙ Print Both those who adamantly oppose and those who support an attack on nuclear Iran are unrealistic, argues Professor Yitzhak Ben-Israel, who rebuts some of the arguments on each side, as well as what he terms myths about Iran and its potential to harm Israel. Author Yitzhak Ben-Israel Posted August 16, 2012 Translator(s)Sandy Bloom 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. The bottom line is that reality does not support either of the two platforms taken by the hard-line supporters and opposers of an assault in Iran.
Red Lines in the Sand - By Graham Allison. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been campaigning for an unambiguous red line to stop Iran's nuclear advance. In an infelicitous foray into American politics last month, he took to the Sunday morning television shows to insist that Barack Obama act to stop Iran, saying, "You have to place that red line before them now. " Smarting from the Obama administration's refusals, he challenged the U.S. president with the zinger: "Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines before Iran don't have a moral right to place a red light before Israel. " Then, at the U.N. General Assembly meeting, he held up a cartoon of a bomb and with a marker drew a red line, declaring that Iran could not be allowed to produce a stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium sufficient (after further enrichment) for its first nuclear bomb.
Addressing the U.S. Nor was this the last time Israeli politicians and officials have announced a point of no return, only to move the goal posts later. Inside Bibi's Bunker - By Chuck Freilich. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's use of a cartoon bomb to illustrate Israel's red lines regarding the Iranian nuclear program may have elicited guffaws among the foreign-policy punditocracy, but the issue is no laughing matter. In fact, Israel's entire defense bureaucracy has long been engaged in an exhaustive assessment of what is undoubtedly among the most difficult decisions Israel has ever faced -- and perhaps the most difficult since David Ben-Gurion declared independence. Israelis remain divided over what to do about Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Many believe that a nuclear Iran poses an existential threat, in the truest sense of the word, and that Israel must do everything within its power to prevent such an outcome. Others believe that the threat is "merely" dire, though probably not existential, that Israel should do everything within reason to prevent it -- but not necessarily everything possible -- and that Israel could, in extremis, live with a nuclear Iran.
Eight Ways to Deal With Iran - By Stephen J. Hadley. The Iranian nuclear program poses one of the most pressing national security challenges confronting the United States today. After years of increasing economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure -- backed by the threat of force -- under both Republican and Democratic administrations, the United States and the international community have still not achieved an acceptable outcome that prevents Iran from using its existing nuclear program for achieving a nuclear weapon.
Meanwhile, Iran is dangerously approaching the threshold of a nuclear weapon capability as its centrifuges continue to produce a growing stockpile of enriched uranium that could be converted into material for a nuclear bomb. We have reached the point where all options -- economic, political, diplomatic, and military -- must be carefully examined and substantively debated in the public domain. These should be viewed as a set of "nested" options that could lead sequentially from one to another. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Obama’s signal to Iran. Obama advised Erdogan that the Iranians should realize that time is running out for a peaceful settlement and that Tehran should take advantage of the current window for negotiations.
Obama didn’t specify whether Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium domestically as part of the civilian program the United States would endorse. That delicate issue evidently would be left for the negotiations that are supposed to start April 13, at a venue yet to be decided. Erdogan is said to have replied that he would convey Obama’s views to Khamenei, and it’s believed he did so when he met the Iranian leader on Thursday. Erdogan also met President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian officials during his visit.
The statement highlighted by Obama as a potential starting point was made on state television in February. The challenge for negotiators is whether it’s possible to turn Khamenei’s public rhetoric into a serious and verifiable commitment not to build a bomb. Davidignatius@washpost.com. Analysis: How Israel might strike at Iran. 27 February 2012Last updated at 03:15 ET By Jonathan Marcus BBC Diplomatic Correspondent An Israeli attack would have to cope with a variety of problems For all the myriad challenges facing Israel over the past decade it is the potential threat from a nuclear-armed Iran that has preoccupied the country's military planners. It is this that in large part has guided the development of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) over recent years.
The IAF has purchased 125 advanced F-15I and F-16I warplanes, equipped with Israeli avionics and additional fuel tanks - tailor-made for long-range strike missions. In addition, Israel has bought specialised bunker-busting munitions; developed large, long-endurance, unmanned aircraft; and much of its training has focused on long-range missions. Israel has a track-record of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear targets in the region. Israel has a track-record of pre-emptive strikes against nuclear targets How to get there? At least three routes are possible.
“Start Quote 1. Analysis: How would Iran respond to an Israeli attack? 6 March 2012Last updated at 19:06 ET By Jonathan Marcus BBC Diplomatic Correspondent Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East Iran has made it clear that if it is attacked either by Israel or the United States it will respond in kind.
But just what could Iran do to strike back? What would be the consequences, both in the region and inside Iran itself? Indeed, could the potential consequences of an Israeli strike be so serious as to make military action the least preferable option in terms of constraining Iran's nuclear programme? Long-distance missiles "Iran's ability to strike back directly against Israel is limited," says Mark Fitzpatrick, director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). "Its antiquated air force is totally outclassed by the Israelis and it has only a limited number of ballistic missiles that could reach Israel. " Enlisting allies Covert action Diplomacy.
Why Iran Should Get the Bomb. The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms.
It should not. Most U.S., European, and Israeli commentators and policymakers warn that a nuclear-armed Iran would be the worst possible outcome of the current standoff. The crisis over Iran's nuclear program could end in three different ways. The second possible outcome is that Iran stops short of testing a nuclear weapon but develops a breakout capability, the capacity to build and test one quite quickly. To continue reading, please log in. Don't have an account? Register Have an account? Target: Iran - By Uri Friedman. Iran's quest to develop nuclear energy dates back to 1957, when the United States began sending low-enriched uranium and nuclear technology to ally Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi for research purposes as part of President Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. But Western powers started having second thoughts about the Iranian nuclear program even before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's embrace of nuclear power in the 1990s only hardened that opposition.
Over the past decade, the West has grown increasingly convinced that Tehran is pursuing nuclear weapons under the guise of civilian atomic work, while Iran's leaders have insisted that they are simply diversifying their energy sources and developing fuel for medical research reactors. The goal of enrichment, as this overview of the nuclear fuel cycle explains, is to increase the proportion of uranium-235 atoms -- "fissile isotopes" that can split in a chain reaction and produce heat -- within uranium.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad se dit "sensible" au sort des Syriens - EXCLUSIVITÉ FRANCE 24. Iran nie buduje bomby atomowej - ostrzega izraelski generał. Szef Sztabu Generalnego Sił Obronnych Izraela generał porucznik Benny Gantz w wywiadzie opublikowanym w środę (25.04) przez dziennik Haaretz wyraża szereg zaskakujących opinii. Jedną z nich jest poważna wątpliwość co do podjęcia przez Teheran decyzji o opracowaniu broni nuklearnej. "Myślę, że irańskie przywództwo składa się z bardzo racjonalnych ludzi. " - m. in. tą teżą zaskoczył opinię publiczną gen Benny Gantz. Było to wystąpienie o tyle niespodziewane, że dotychczas przyzwyczailiśmy się do bardzo ostrej retoryki Tel-Awiwu skierowanej w stronę Iranu.
Gantz tłumaczył, że Iran nie chce zrezygnować z programu rozwoju energii atomowej, gdyż z perspektywy Teheranu jest on "zbyt cenny". Zauważył także, że decyzja o uzyskaniu broni nuklearnej należy do duchowego przywódcy Islamskiej Republiki Iranu, Ajatollaha Ali Chamenei'ego, i nie została jeszcze podjęta. (źródło: Wikimedia Commons) Na podstawie: bbc.co.uk, aljazeera.com, rt.com, haaretz.com. Iran and nuclear weapons: Sticks now, carrots later. Don’t Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East - By Steven A. Cook. On March 21, Haaretz correspondent Ari Shavit wrote a powerful op-ed in the New York Times that began with this stark and stunning claim: "An Iranian atom bomb will force Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt to acquire their own atom bombs. " Indeed, it has become axiomatic among Middle East watchers, nonproliferation experts, Israel's national security establishment, and a wide array of U.S. government officials that Iranian proliferation will lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
President Barack Obama himself, in a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) last month, said that if Iran went nuclear, it was "almost certain that others in the region would feel compelled to get their own nuclear weapon. " This logic was undoubtedly at work when Pakistan embarked on a nuclear program in 1972 to match India's nuclear development program. But even if the Turks wanted their own bomb, they have almost no capacity to develop nuclear weapons technology. Iran Watch: Fordoomed? Last week, I explained how upcoming nuclear talks could get bogged down in disagreement if Western powers demand that Iran, as a confidence-building measure, stop enriching uranium to 20 percent (which is steps away from weapons-grade material) and ship existing stockpiles of the higher grade uranium out of the country.
Over the weekend, the New York Times reported that the United States and its European allies will indeed open negotiations with this demand, along with a call for Iran to shutter a nuclear facility burrowed under a mountain: The hard-line approach would require the country's military leadership to give up the Fordo enrichment plant outside the holy city of Qum, and with it a huge investment in the one facility that is most hardened against airstrikes....
"We have no idea how the Iranians will react," one senior administration official said. "We probably won't know after the first meeting. " Iran meter: The Times report hasn't just provoked a strong reaction in Iran. Are we serious about talking with Tehran. For the life of me, I can't figure out what the Obama administration is thinking about Iran. And I can't tell if the administration is more confused than I am. Let me explain. The first part of the puzzle was a column by the Washington Post's David Ignatius last week, which reported that "President Obama has signaled Iran that the United States would accept an Iranian civilian nuclear program if Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei can back up his recent public claims that his nation 'will never pursue nuclear weapons.'" Ignatius' story was obviously based on testimony from administration insiders, and the leaks were probably intended to send the message that diplomacy was working and that military force wasn't needed.
In a similar vein, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told ABC News on April 3 that "it's our very strong belief, as President Obama conveyed to the Israelis, that it is not in anyone's interest for them to take unilateral action. So far, so good. But here's why I'm confused. Iran and the United States Face Off in Turkey. As U.S. and Iranian officials prepare to face off in Istanbul this weekend to negotiate the future of Iran's nuclear program, stakes are high and expectations are low.
The meetings will mark the first direct talks on Iran's nuclear program in nearly 15 months. The hiatus has been anything but quiet. Since the two sides last met in Istanbul in January 2011, the Arab Spring has thrown the region into upheaval, international sanctions have choked Tehran's finances, and Israel has led the charge for military attacks on Iranian nuclear sites. Come Monday, there will be no durable resolution to the controversy, uncertainty, and concern surrounding Iran's nuclear program. Even so, Washington and Tehran might not emerge from the weekend empty-handed but with modest confidence-building measures demonstrating that there is still room -- and time -- for debate.
In the run-up to Istanbul, both sides have been spinning messages in the popular news media. To continue reading, please log in. Register. Iran and the Bomb. ONE STEP TOO FARColin H. Kahl Kenneth Waltz is probably right that a nuclear-armed Iran could be deterred from deliberately using nuclear weapons or transferring a nuclear device to terrorists ("Why Iran Should Get the Bomb," July/August 2012). But he is dead wrong that the Islamic Republic would likely become a more responsible international actor if it crossed the nuclear threshold. In making that argument, Waltz mischaracterizes Iranian motivations and badly misreads history. And despite the fact that Waltz is one of the world's most respected international relations theorists, he ignores important political science research into the effects of nuclear weapons, including recent findings that suggest that new nuclear states are often more reckless and aggressive at lower levels of conflict.
Waltz correctly notes that Iran's leaders, despite their fanatical rhetoric, are fundamentally rational. To continue reading, please log in. Don't have an account? Register.