Market design. Market design blog « Peter Cramton. By Peter Cramton, on 30 January 2013 Today the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) set arbitrary prices for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment (DME) supplies based on CMS’ flawed bidding process.
It was not the bidders who set the prices, but CMS through its arbitrary manipulation of the quantities associated with each bidder. CMS was able to pick . . . → Read More: Anatomy of a Failed “Auction” for Medicare Supplies By Peter Cramton, on 24 December 2012 I created the following “Market Design” word cloud with a Google Scholar search “auction OR matching OR ‘market design’”. By Peter Cramton, on 7 December 2012 Dear Applicants and other Stakeholders, If you are coming to Los Angeles for ICANN’s Prioritization Draw on December 17, I recommend that you stay another day and attend the Applicant Auction Conference at the nearby Marriott Santa Monica (a 20 minute taxi ride) on December 18. By Peter Cramton, on 18 September 2012 By Peter Cramton, on 18 July 2011 Dear PAOC Members: 1. Working Group Descriptions: Market Design. Susan Athey and Parag Pathak, Directors Over the past two decades, economic research and ideas have played an increased role in the practical organization and design of markets.
Some examples include auctions for spectrum, electricity, Treasury bills, timber, and other commodities; tradable permit systems for pollution abatement and other environmental regulations; internet search advertising; market mechanisms for innovation; labor market clearinghouses; centralized systems for the allocation of organs; formal procedures for student assignment; and other related matching and trading processes. In each of these cases, both theory and empirical and experimental research have influenced the design of market institutions.
"Market design" examines the reasons why markets institutions fail and considers the properties of alternative mechanisms, in terms of efficiency, fairness, incentives, and complexity. Working Papers by NBER Working Group - MD. Al Roth's game theory, experimental economics, and market design page. Updated 9/8/12 Check out my Market Design Blog Comments welcome at al_roth"at"harvard.edu Update: 1/30/13.
I am slowly getting a new webpage at Stanford: . For a little while its links will still point back here, but eventually it will be self contained. I'll do new updates there, so please point your browsers to my new page. (It's been a while since I updated this page, but I've kept updating my Market Design Blog (and the most exciting posts are probably this one on my students on the job market this year, and those tagged Nobel ). Update: 9/8/12. My Harvard mailing addresses, phone numbers, and other contact info are here. My research is in game theory, experimental economics, and market design (for which game theory, experimentation, and computation are complementary tools). Here is my Spring 2012 course in Experimental Economics (Ec 2040/HBS 4160). Here is my Fall 2011 Market Design course (supplemented by a Market Design Blog) . Two-sided matching models. permission to webpublish. ECON 2056a Home § Economics 2056a (Fall 2010-2011) Econ 2056a / Market Design.