54- Russia's Far East Policy. Russian writers like Dmitri Trenin have called developing the Russian Far East (RFE) a civilizational task.
At the same time Moscow has acknowledged that developing the RFE is the foundation for any successful Russian claim to an independent great power status in Asia. Yet careful examination of Russian relations with the major Northeast Asian powers: China, Japan, and South Korea, strongly suggests that Russia has failed at this task and that its economic-political system is the primary reason for this failure. Given the stakes involved, this failure has consequences, namely Russia's excessive reliance on China to assist in the development of the RFE. During 2009-10 we saw this growth in Chinese power as China bailed out Russian oil producers on condition that in East Asia they supply China alone with oil.
52- Russia's Saudi Arabian Diplomacy. Relations between Russia and Saudi Arabia have never been as friendly as they were in 2009.
After years of tension over Saudi support for Islamist fundamentalism in the post-Soviet space and Russia's proximity to Iran and Iraq, Moscow and Riyadh have progressively moved closer to each other. This rapprochement was aided by the increasing complexity of their respective relationships with the US, concerns caused by the situation in Iraq and, between 2003 and 2008, rising fuel prices. Nevertheless, their relations are limited by their different interests in the energy field and are subject to the fluctuating political climate in the Middle East, notably with regard to the Iran dossier. Ultimately, by moving closer to Riyadh, Moscow primarily hopes to improve its political image and reaffirm its presence in the Arab-Muslim world.
The Kremlin is hedging its bets and its relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia remain dependent on its relations with Washington. 53-Results of the "Reset" in US-Russian Relations. 50- Europe in Russian Foreign Policy: It is now necessary to ask ourselves what place Europe holds in Russian foreign policy, given the recent developments in the latter.
Indeed, Europe is by far Russia's most important partner. Nevertheless, Russia is developing a discourse of emerging state, in order to highlight the rapid loss of influence of Europeans in global affairs. Europe is still necessary in Moscow's eyes, but is no longer sufficient on its own. Russia is anticipating Europe's marginalization, all the while knowing that its own level of marginalization will depend upon the relationship that it forges with it. It is necessary to examine how Europe has passed from being a model for Russia's development to a political competitor. 49. Russia's Greater Middle East Policy. 47- Russia, China and the US Strategic Tri. Over the past decade, there has been much talk about a new world order, in which American "unipolarity" would be superseded by more equal arrangements between the great powers.
One such idea is a return to the Russia-China-US triangle. In truth, however, the time for such geopolitical schemes has long passed. The contemporary international system is too complex and interdependent to be reduced to crude strategic balancing-a reality underlined by the global financial crisis. The most likely successor to US global leadership is not a "multipolar world order" dominated by the great powers, but a rough Sino-American bipolarity. This would bear little resemblance to the stark model of the cold war era, but instead foreshadow a new, post-modern triangle. 45-Westernizers&Sinophiles in Russian FP. 40-NATO & Russia : Threat Perceptions. 39- Obama and Russia. 54- Russia's Far East Policy: Looking Beyond China. 38- Russia in Latin America. 37-Russia's Armed Forces:Power of Illusi. 21- Russia and the Deadlock over Kosovo. 16- Russia and the WTO. 9- Ukraine : Weakness & Dependence.
1- The Sino-Russian Relations.