Revisions of JTB approaches. Attempts to dissolve the problem. Infallibilism, indefeasibility. Reliabilism. Reliabilism, a category of theories in the philosophical discipline of epistemology, has been advanced as a theory of knowledge, both of justification and of knowledge.
Process reliabilism has been used as an argument against philosophical skepticism, such as the brain in a vat thought experiment.[1] Process reliabilism is a form of epistemic externalism.[1] A broadly reliabilist theory of knowledge is roughly as follows: One knows that p (p stands for any proposition--e.g., that the sky is blue) if and only if p is true, one believes that p is true, and one has arrived at the belief that p through some reliable process. [citation needed] A broadly reliabilist theory of justified belief can be stated as follows: One has a justified belief that p if, and only if, the belief is the result of a reliable process. Moreover, a similar account can be given (and an elaborate version of this has been given by Alvin Plantinga) for such notions as 'warranted belief' or 'epistemically rational belief'. Other responses. Experimental research.