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'The US cannot defeat Isil, Iran cannot defeat Isil. They need to come together against a common threat' Isil had been waiting for their moment - a sandstorm, which gave them cover from the coalition jets.

'The US cannot defeat Isil, Iran cannot defeat Isil. They need to come together against a common threat'

As the skies disappeared, they brought up one of their feared special weapons, the sort of device that has in the last year turned the deserts of the Middle East into a Mad Max fantasy. Iraq: Growth of the Shia militia - BBC News. When Islamic State (IS) seized control of Iraq's second largest city, Mosul, in June 2014, along with other parts of the predominantly Sunni Arab north-west, Iraq's Shia militia were mobilised to launch a counter-offensive against the jihadists.

Iraq: Growth of the Shia militia - BBC News

The collapse of Iraq's armed forces in the face of the IS advance led to these militia playing a pivotal role in government security operations over the past year, most notably in Tikrit. However, they have also come under criticism for alleged human rights abuses, a charge their commanders deny. Anti-Saddam. Experts weigh in (part 5): Is quietist Salafism the alternative to ISIS?

Will McCants: Graeme Wood’s article on ISIS in this month’s Atlantic touched off a national debate about the insurgent group’s uses and abuses of Islam.

Experts weigh in (part 5): Is quietist Salafism the alternative to ISIS?

Over the next few weeks, we thought it would be interesting for scholars of ISIS and political Islam to think through some of the issues raised by Wood, giving him a chance to weigh in along the way. First out of the gate was Jacob Olidort, who responded to Graeme Wood’s idea that “quietist” Salafis who do not engage in politics or warfare represent an antidote to violent, activist Salafi groups like ISIS on the basis that all Salafis—jihadi or not—share similar ideologies.

Salafis are ultraconservative Sunni Muslims. Some Salafis engage in parliamentary politics and some engage in revolution (“jihadis” in their parlance). Nigeria’s Election: Brought To You By These Hired Guns. For the militants of Boko Haram, 2015 began like most any year: with death and chaos.

Nigeria’s Election: Brought To You By These Hired Guns

Three days into the New Year, the Nigeria-based Islamist terrorist group attacked Baga, a Nigerian town on the banks of the Lake Chad, shared by Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It was one of Boko Haram’s most devastating attacks ever, leaving up to 2,000 people dead in its wake. That was unsurprising for an insurgency that spent most of last year overrunning countless towns and villages in Nigeria’s northeast, seizing control an area believed to be as large as Belgium. Then in late January, everything began to change. A Syria-First Strategy to Fight ISIS. The battle to retake Tikrit from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has been a serious test of the United States’ current strategy in Iraq.

A Syria-First Strategy to Fight ISIS

Gaming ISIS. When the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham broke into the headlines in early 2014 after conquering Fallujah, the group was not taken very seriously.

Gaming ISIS

Responding to a question about the recent successes of groups flying al Qaeda’s flag, U.S. President Barack Obama said that “if a JV team puts on Lakers uniforms, that doesn’t make them Kobe Bryant.” By midsummer, after ISIS seized control of large sections of Syria and Iraq and declared a new caliphate, the snark started turning into panic. And by early 2015, ISIS had displaced al Qaeda as the hottest brand in global jihad. Shocked into mounting some sort of response to these developments, the Obama administration pressed for a new Iraqi government, sent aid to Baghdad and the Kurds up north, launched air attacks against ISIS targets, and tried to put together an anti-ISIS coalition. Experts weigh in (part 3): Is quietist Salafism the antidote to ISIS? Will McCants:Graeme Wood’s article on ISIS in this month’s Atlantic touched off a national debate about the insurgent group’s uses and abuses of Islam.

Experts weigh in (part 3): Is quietist Salafism the antidote to ISIS?

Over the next few weeks, we thought it would be interesting for scholars of ISIS and political Islam to think through some of the issues raised by Wood, giving him a chance to weigh in along the way. First out of the gate was Jacob Olidort, who responded to Graeme Wood’s idea that “quietist” Salafis who do not engage in politics or warfare represent an antidote to violent, activist Salafi groups like ISIS on the basis that all Salafis—jihadi or not—share similar ideologies. Salafis are ultraconservative Sunni Muslims. Some Salafis engage in parliamentary politics and some engage in revolution (“jihadis” in their parlance). But most Salafis don’t engage in direct political action—earning them the appellation of “quietist” from Western academics.

What ISIS Really Wants. What is “Islamic”? A Muslim Response to ISIS and The Atlantic. Graeme Wood's “What ISIS Really Wants,” published in the March 2015 edition of The Atlantic, has quickly become the most widely read article on the militant group.

What is “Islamic”? A Muslim Response to ISIS and The Atlantic

Indeed, it is becoming the most read article ever published by The Atlantic. Popular as it is, Wood's essay is deeply flawed and alarmingly tone-deaf – dangerously so. What is so objectionable about Wood's essay is encapsulated in his statement: “The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic.” Where Terrorism Research Goes Wrong. Photo TERRORISM is increasing.

Where Terrorism Research Goes Wrong

According to the Global Terrorism Database at the University of Maryland, groups connected with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State committed close to 200 attacks per year between 2007 and 2010, a number that grew by more than 300 percent, to about 600 attacks, in 2013. Since 9/11, the study of terrorism has also increased. Now, you might think that more study would lead to more effective antiterrorism policies and thus to less terrorism.

The Question of Theodicy and Jihad. This popup will be closed in: 19 War on the Rocks is expanding!

The Question of Theodicy and Jihad

We need your help to grow War on the Rocks into an even bigger and better experience. Please visit our crowdfunding page and support your favorite outlet on strategy, defense, and foreign affairs! ISIS’s Apocalyptic Vision. ISIS (referred to by many names, including ISIL and the Islamic State) did not suddenly appear on the day the group beheaded the American journalist James Foley, but formed out of the remnants of the group known as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). ISIS evolved out of the thinking and practices of AQI’s leader, the former-thug-turned-jihadist Abu Musab Zarqawi, also called the Sheikh of Slaughterers. Der politische Islam ignoriert die theologische Tradition von 1400 Jahren. “Liberal” und “aufgeklärt” müsse der Islam werden. What the jihadists who bought “Islam for Dummies” on Amazon tell us about radicalisation. Can you guess which books the wannabe jihadists Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed ordered online from Amazon before they set out from Birmingham to fight in Syria last May?

A copy of Milestones by the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb? No. How about Messages to the World: the Statements of Osama Bin Laden? Guess again. Les peshmergas et la glamourisation des femmes soldats. En treillis ou en jeans, casquettes imprimé camouflage vissées sur la tête, cheveux lâchés, les femmes soldats kurdes libérées des diktats islamistes sont devenues des icônes.

Que l'on aperçoit tous les jours dans les Journaux télévisés ou les magazines où elles revendiquent leur combat pour libérer les femmes «de l’emprise extrémiste» . Les reportages se succèdent, tandis qu'elles participent à la résistance armée à Kobané, bastion kurde. La présence de ces femmes parmi les soldats impressionne. Même si elle est en réalité ancienne. Car ces femmes sont des proches du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK) qui prône une société égalitaire où le patriarcat n’a plus lieu d’être. The Roots of the Islamic State's Appeal. 45/2014 - Interview - Ismail Küpeli im Gespräch über den Aufstieg des Islamischen Staats. Die Türkei scheint sich nach langem Widerstand bereit erklärt zu haben, kurdische Kämpfer über ihre Grenze in die vom IS bedrohte Stadt Kobanê zu lassen. Ist das eine Wende in der Politik der türkischen Regierung gegenüber dem IS? Nein, das ist keine Wende.

Vielmehr gab es seit etwa sechs Monaten eine langsame Bewegung, seit der Sommeroffensive des IS im Nordirak und der Geiselnahme türkischer Diplomaten in Mossul durch den IS. Der IS hat sich durch die Eroberung der Erdölquellen im Nordirak sehr große ­finanzielle Einnahmen sichern können, womit eine größere Eigenständigkeit gegenüber den bisherigen Unterstützern des IS, etwa den arabischen Golfstaaten und der Türkei, einhergeht.

Dies erklärt auch die Geiselnahme und bedeutet, dass die Türkei den IS nicht mehr als bloßes Werkzeug gegen das Regime Bashar al-Assads und die Kurden in Nordsyrien nutzen kann. Ismail Küpeli, Politikwissenschaftler (Foto: Privat) Nein, kann man nicht.