WikiLeaks a instauré un nouveau type de rapports entre journalisme et technologie. Wikileaks. WikiLeaks and Julian Paul Assange. The house on Grettisgata Street, in Reykjavik, is a century old, small and white, situated just a few streets from the North Atlantic. The shifting northerly winds can suddenly bring ice and snow to the city, even in springtime, and when they do a certain kind of silence sets in. This was the case on the morning of March 30th, when a tall Australian man named Julian Paul Assange, with gray eyes and a mop of silver-white hair, arrived to rent the place. Assange was dressed in a gray full-body snowsuit, and he had with him a small entourage. “We are journalists,” he told the owner of the house. Assange is an international trafficker, of sorts.
Iceland was a natural place to develop Project B. Assange also wanted to insure that, once the video was posted online, it would be impossible to remove. Assange typically tells would-be litigants to go to hell. In his writing online, especially on Twitter, Assange is quick to lash out at perceived enemies. “That’s for you,” she said. “Someone?” La philosophie politique de Julian Assange.
À titre de document et de contribution au débat, Contretemps publie un texte écrit par Julian Assange en 2006, au moment de la fondation de Wikileaks. Ce texte théorique éclaire rétrospectivement sa visée stratégique. Contrairement à ce qu’une lecture hâtive peut laisser penser, ce qui est proposé ici n’est pas tant une théorie du complot – du moins pas sous la forme classique de la dénonciation paranoïaque – qu’un usage heuristique du modèle organisationnel de la conspiration : un réseau de pouvoir dont on peut tracer la carte.
Assange est un hacker. S’il modélise la structure d’un pouvoir, c’est pour en découvrir les failles. Ce moyen, ce contre-dispositif, il l’entrevoit dans ces lignes. Préambule : Des effets non-linéaires des fuites sur les systèmes de gouvernance injustes Il se peut que vous lisiez La route d’Hanoï ou La conspiration comme mode de gouvernance, un texte d’orientation obscur, à peu près inutile tiré de son contexte, et peut-être même dès le départ. Introduction. Wikileaks and the Long Haul Clay Shirky. Like a lot of people, I am conflicted about Wikileaks. Citizens of a functioning democracy must be able to know what the state is saying and doing in our name, to engage in what Pierre Rosanvallon calls “counter-democracy”*, the democracy of citizens distrusting rather than legitimizing the actions of the state.
Wikileaks plainly improves those abilities. On the other hand, human systems can’t stand pure transparency. For negotiation to work, people’s stated positions have to change, but change is seen, almost universally, as weakness. People trying to come to consensus must be able to privately voice opinions they would publicly abjure, and may later abandon. And so we have a tension between two requirements for democratic statecraft, one that can’t be resolved, but can be brought to an acceptable equilibrium. As Tom Slee puts it, “Your answer to ‘what data should the government make public?’ If the long haul were all there was, Wikileaks would be an obviously bad thing. Analysing WikiLeaks: Bruce Sterling's plot holes.