Reciprocal Unilateral Measures. “Reciprocal unilateral measures” is not my favorite phrase, despite my rather considerable affection for some of the people who have made use of it. There is nothing wrong with the concept, mind you, but RUMs? Ugh. The term is back in our discourse, thanks to the Secretary of State’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), which has prepared an an otherwise sensible draft report on Options for Implementing Additional Nuclear Force Reductions. My complaint with RUMs is equal parts pedantic, political and substantive. SInce this is just a draft report, consider this an open letter to the ISAB to drop a term that mars an otherwise elegant idea. First, the pedantry. [Reciprocal] Of the nature of, or relating to, a return (in kind); made, given, etc., in response; answering, corresponding.
The definition of unilateral is “without reciprocal obligation” — at best, “reciprocal unilateral” is nonsense. Second, the politics of “reciprocal unilateral measures” are terrible. Duma sets its own understandings of New START - Blog - Russian strategic nuclear forces. The first draft of the New START ratification law that emerged from the Duma committees was very brief - the entire document included one paragraph: Ratify the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on measures for further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010.
That was it - 27 words (in Russian). But that, of course, was before the Duma had a chance to listen to the discussion in the U.S. Senate or to read the Senate resolution of ratification. Even though the Senate did not change the text of the treaty, the ratification resolution includes some understanding and conditions that Russia is concerned could affect the meaning of some of the treaty provisions. To counter that, Russia drafted its own list of understandings, which were included into the treaty during the so-called second reading of the ratification law.
Withdrawal conditions are specified in the Article 4 of the law. 2. New Article: Russian Nuclear Forces, 2011 » FAS Strategic Security Blog. . By Hans M. Kristensen The latest Nuclear Notebook in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists with our updated estimate of Russian nuclear forces is now available via Sage Publications: We estimate that Russia currently has nearly 2,430 strategic warheads assigned to operational strategic missiles and bombers, although most of the bomber weapons are probably in central storage. Another 3,700-5,400 nonstrategic warheads are in central storage, of which an estimated 2,080 can be delivered by nonstrategic aircraft, naval vessels and short-range missiles. See also: US Nuclear Forces, 2011 | US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011 | Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons After the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (Brief 2011) This publication was made possible by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York and Ploughshares Fund.
A new START (2010-2011) Russian strategic nuclear forces. Russian Tactical Nuclear Weapons » FAS Strategic Security Blog. . By Hans M. Kristensen Two recent news reports have drawn the attention to Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. Earlier this week, RIA Novosti quoted Vice Admiral Oleg Burtsev, deputy head of the Russian Navy General Staff, saying that the role of tactical nuclear weapons on submarines “will play a key role in the future,” that their range and precision are gradually increasing, and that Russia “can install low-yield warheads on existing cruise missiles” with high-yield warheads. This morning an editorial in the New York Times advocated withdrawing the “200 to 300” U.S. tactical nuclear bombs deployed in Europe “to make it much easier to challenge Russia to reduce its stockpile of at least 3,000 short-range weapons.” Both reports compel – each in their own way – the Obama administration to address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons.
The Russian Inventory Like the United States, Russia doesn’t say much about the status of its tactical nuclear weapons. . The Other Nuclear Powers.