Comité Balladur - Grand Paris. De l'utilité du « corps des Ponts » par T. Duclaux - Grand Paris. Lundi 25 mai 1 25 /05 /Mai 19:37 Thierry Duclaux, président de l'Association des ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées, directeur général de VNF. Les ingénieurs des Ponts et Chaussées, qu'ils exercent dans le public ou dans le privé, n'attendent que cela. Or il semblerait que la fusion précède la vision.
Il est temps cependant d'y remédier en respectant quelques principes de base. Il fautun corps bien formé, avec une gestion de carrière ouverte sur ses voisins comme sur le monde... Regardons les expériences du secteur privé. Encore faut-il que l'Etat définisse de quel type de compétence il a besoin. Dans cet esprit, l'administration doit réfléchir aux orientations possibles. Partager l'article ! InShare Par Association Grand Paris - Publié dans : France : Débat Territoires 0. The post-industrialising city: political perspectives and cultur.
Foreign Policy: Why Hawks Win. National leaders get all sorts of advice in times of tension and conflict. But often the competing counsel can be broken down into two basic categories. On one side are the hawks: They tend to favor coercive action, are more willing to use military force, and are more likely to doubt the value of offering concessions. When they look at adversaries overseas, they often see unremittingly hostile regimes who only understand the language of force.
On the other side are the doves, skeptical about the usefulness of force and more inclined to contemplate political solutions. Where hawks see little in their adversaries but hostility, doves often point to subtle openings for dialogue. As the hawks and doves thrust and parry, one hopes that the decision makers will hear their arguments on the merits and weigh them judiciously before choosing a course of action.
None of this means that hawks are always wrong. The effect of this failure in conflict situations can be pernicious. Bias and war: Why hawks win « Bias and Belief. An outstanding piece of writing on biases that came out last year was Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon’s “Why Hawks Win” in Foreign Policy. Rather than look at the evidence or effects for one particular bias, the authors consider the whole spectrum of biases and how they affect a particular decision: of whether or not to go to war.
Kahneman is especially well-placed to do this since with Amos Tversky and other colleagues he set off the whole “Heuristics and Biases research programme” that has spawned thousands of experiments and earned him a Nobel memorial prize in Economics. Is there a general lesson from bias research about war? According to that authors, yes: “All the biases in our list favor hawks. [...] biases have the effect of making wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end.” Some of these biases I’ve discussed previously on this blog. Like this: Like Loading...
Logical inference and human rationality. Logical Omniscience Classically, a rational belief system is logically closed. localized as possible. We learn to live with errors, set priorities for conflict-resolution and establish emergency mechanisms to ensure a graceful degradation of output if we cannot mask the problem (see [8]).
As mentioned before, a rational agent is expected to draw obvious consequences, but even if logical omniscience could be part of a model of implicit beliefs, it is certainly too strong for the explicit ones, and it is not a rational desideratum if the agent is prone to inconsistency. An infallible inferential system starts with a set of logical truths, and processes them through valid rules of inference that preserve truth. Unfortunately, we do not always start from necessary assumptions, our information is often false and almost always incomplete. In data base systems, a lot of effort goes into ensuring and maintaining consistency (sometimes misnamed "truth" maintenance)
. [9] da Costa, Newton C. J.